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ABSTRACT 
Over the past several decades, social network remains the most prevalent and 
prominent in the strategy and organization theory literature.  However, despite the 
considerable research attention scholars devoted to exploring the implications and 
mechanisms of social ties and networks in management and organizational contexts, the 
following question has largely remained understudied: To what extent can top managers’ 
personal ties and networks actually contribute to their firms? This thesis will strive to 
explore this research question by theoretically highlighting three logically consequent 
managerial decisions: (1) “When”—when will top managers choose to use their personal 
ties and networks in their firms; (2) “How”—will top managers use their managerial ties 
and networks to serve the best interest of their firms or to satisfy their self-interests; and 
(3) “So what” —how would the decision of using managerial ties and networks to benefit 
their firms influence other decisions of the firms.  Using both primary data and archival 
information from Chinese firms, I will empirically test the step-wise framework.  I expect 
this thesis to contribute to both strategic leadership and social network research and 
management practices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
	  2 
GENERAL RESEARCH QUESTION DEVELOPMENT 
Over the past three decades, scholars have devoted considerable attention to 
examining top managers’ personal ties and networks1 (i.e., managerial ties and networks, 
see Carpenter, Li, & Jiang (2012) for an extensive review).  Through the perspective of 
strategic leadership and upper-echelon theory (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; 
Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), as the major agents of their firms 
(Hambrick, 2007; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), top managers are naturally motivated 
to use their personal endowments (including their social connections) to serve their firms.  
Following this logic, scholars have commonly deemed managerial ties and networks 
valuable resources that can significantly benefit firms, providing access to otherwise 
inaccessible resources (Shane & Cable, 2002; Hallen, 2008; Uzzi & Ryon, 2003), 
reducing transaction costs in interorganizational relationships (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997), 
and enhancing firm performance (Acquaah, 2007; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Li 
& Zhang, 2007).  Accordingly, so far, a wide-spread consensus on managerial ties and 
networks in the extant literature is the “micro-macro link” (c.f., Peng & Luo, 2000), i.e., 
the association between managerial ties and networks and their beneficial implications 
for firms.  However, I argue that this micro-macro link perspective may be incomplete. 
I initiate my argument by anatomizing the seemingly straightforward micro-
macro link.  The argument of micro-macro link naturally involves two different actors: 
top managers, the personal actors who directly participate in managerial ties and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Importantly, following prior social embeddedness studies (e.g., Shane & Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1997, 1999; 
Uzzi & Lancester, 2003) in this dissertation study I mainly focus on managers’ embedded ties/networks 
with entities outside of the firms they serve (e.g., people in other firms, governments).  Embedded 
ties/networks (e.g., friendship or family ties/networks) differentiates from arm’s-length ties/networks with 
the existence of mutual confiding, reciprocal service, emotional attachment and shared time between 
participants (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1999).  Without particular specification, the managerial (personal) 
ties/networks discussed in this study all refer to embedded ties/networks of managers with entities outside 
of their firms. 
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networks, and the firms, the organizational actors that benefit from managerial ties and 
networks.  There is a basic fact with regard to these two actors: It is the top managers as 
individual social actors, rather than the focal firms as organizations, that actually 
maintain and control the valuable managerial ties and networks and make the decision of 
using them.  In such a manner, the “owner” and beneficiary of managerial ties and 
networks in the argument of micro-macro link are actually separated.  Parallel to the 
well-acknowledged argument about the separation of ownership and control in the 
agency theory literature (i.e, Allow, 1984; Fama & Jenson, 1983), I define this critical 
feature of the micro-macro link as “the separation of ownership and beneficiary”. 
Drawing on this insight, it is reasonable to posit that the micro-macro link 
between managerial ties and networks and their beneficial implications for firms may not 
necessarily stand.  Specifically, as discussed above, the central bond that connects the 
“ownership” and the “beneficiary” is top managers’ role as organizational agents and 
strategic leaders of their firms (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Li & Zhang, 2007).  It is the best 
interest and responsibilities borne by this organizational agent role that drives the top 
managers to lend their personal network endowments to their firms.  However, to the 
work-life interface literature (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Korman, Wittig-Berman, & Lang, 
1981), top managers simultaneously assume multiple roles.  Particularly, it is natural that 
they serve both as the organizational agents of their firms and as individual social entities 
in their personal life (Carpenter et al., 2012; Korman & Korman, 1980).  Given the 
distinct natures of these two managerial roles, they intrinsically bear different 
responsibilities and indicate different interest demands, and may thus require managers to 
act differently to fulfill the distinct requirements of these two roles (Edwards & Rothbard, 
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2000; Kanter, 1977).  In such a manner, when managers make the decision about using 
their managerial ties and networks, they may naturally concern both the best interests of 
their firms and their self-interests (Shapiro, 2005; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  
Naturally, using managerial ties and networks to benefit their firms may have different 
implications for the two sets of interest considerations.  That is, it naturally satisfies the 
firms’ best interests, but may not necessarily represent the self-interests of top managers 
as individual social actors.  On the one hand, directly participating in and maintaining 
these managerial ties and networks, top managers may personally bear the potential costs 
of using these social connections (Carpenter et al., 2012).  On the other hand, as only a 
part of their firms, top managers cannot personally capture all the benefits of using 
managerial ties and networks to serve their firms.  As a result, out of their self-interest 
considerations, top managers may not necessarily decide to use managerial ties and 
networks to benefit their firms.  First, they may decide to not use their managerial ties 
and networks in the operation of their firms.  Moreover, even if they decide to use their 
managerial ties and networks in their firms, they may use them in ways that benefit 
themselves rather than the firms (Jiang, Cannella, Jiao, & Gao, 2013).  Accordingly, 
subject to these decisions, firms may not necessarily benefit from the managerial ties and 
networks of their top managers. 
Taken together, I argue that behind the micro-macro link between managerial ties 
and networks and their beneficial implications for firms are the managerial decision-
making processes through which top managers deliberately balance the benefits and costs 
of using managerial ties and networks based on the best interests of both their firms and 
themselves.  These decisions may directly determine the extent to which firms can 
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actually benefit from the managerial ties and networks of their top managers.  However, 
the extant micro-macro link literature has almost exclusively adopted the standpoint of 
firms, endeavoring to shed light on the beneficial implications of managerial ties and 
networks as well as the mechanisms through which these benefits take place (Carpenter 
et al., 2012).  This emphasis explicitly or implicitly presumes that they will always use 
their managerial ties and networks to serve the best interests of their firms.  Accordingly, 
little research effort has been devoted to examining such managerial decision-making 
processes underlying the micro-macro link, therefore largely leaving open the following 
question: To what extent do firms actually benefit from the managerial ties and 
networks of their top managers? 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Against this backdrop, in this dissertation research I attempt to shed light on the 
understudied question—to what extent do firms actually benefit from the managerial ties 
and networks of their top managers.  As discussed above, to accurately understand the 
practical value of managerial ties and networks, it is necessary to explore the managerial 
decision-making processes through which top managers deliberately balance the benefits 
and costs of using managerial ties and networks.  In the three essays, I respectively focus 
on the following three managerial decisions, which are in substance interrelated to each 
other in a logical sequence: 1) “When”—when will managers choose to use their 
personal ties and networks in their firms; 2) “How”—will managers use their 
managerial ties and networks to serve the best interest of their firms or to satisfy their 
self-interests; and 3) “So what” —how would the decision of using managerial ties and 
networks to benefit their firms affect other decisions in firms.  These three decisions 
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capture three important missing connections in the micro-macro link, which together tie 
in a general theoretical framework about the process through which the potential value of 
managerial ties and networks can be realized in firms.  Figure 1 depicts this framework. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
When.  In the first study, I focus on an interesting yet long neglected topic in 
network research literature: while there is a consensus that social networks can be highly 
valuable resources and benefit network participants saliently, does the instrumental 
value of social ties and networks necessarily mean that actors will definitely use the 
social ties and networks they possess? Namely, a subtle yet critical issue has been largely 
overlooked in prior network studies: Being personally connected with another (i.e., 
“having a tie”) does not necessarily mean that an actor will always try to capture benefits 
from this social tie (i.e., “using a tie”) (Carpenter et al., 2012).  First, the instrumental 
value of a tie depends, at least partially, on context (Burt, 1992, 1997; Li et al., 2008).  
More importantly, it has been well-established that using social ties can incur costs (e.g., 
Granovetter, 1985; Portes, 1996, 2000; Putnam, 1995).  As such, actors may naturally be 
cautious about calling upon their social contacts, thus making the two notions, “having a 
tie” and “using a tie”, to differ theoretically and practically from each other.   
This distinction between having a tie and using a tie may have especially 
important implications for managers’ decision of using managerial ties and networks in 
their firms.  As discussed, managers may personally bear the risks and costs when they 
draw upon these personal social contacts in their firms, especially the potential loss of the 
personal social capital they lend to their firms (Carpenter et al., 2012).  In such a manner, 
it is reasonable to posit that managers will be cautious when deciding whether to use their 
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managerial ties in their firms as well as which managerial ties they choose to use.  
However, without specifically differentiating between having a tie and using a tie, prior 
studies have largely left open the following question: When do managers use their 
personal ties in their firms’ operation?  
The first study is designed to address this understudied question in the extant 
literature.  Using a special research setting—entrepreneurs in new ventures, I attempt to 
examine the ways in which entrepreneurs make the decision to use (or not to use) their 
managerial ties to facilitate the fundraising process of their new ventures, a special case 
of managerial tie and network utilization in their firms. 
How.  I attempt to shed light on a natural following-up question of the issue when 
in the second study.  As discussed above, top managers may base their decision about 
using their managerial ties and networks on both the best interests of their firms and their 
self-interests.  In such a manner, it is natural that managerial ties and networks can be 
used by managers to benefit themselves personally or to benefit their firms (Carpenter et 
al., 2012; Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005).  For example, prior studies have well 
documented that fact that managers may apply their personal ties with external 
stakeholders (e.g., government officials, managers in other firms) to advance the 
performance of their organizations (e.g., Acquaah, 2007; Li & Zhang, 2007; Peng & Luo, 
2000).  Meanwhile, it has also been widely noticed that top executives may also use their 
friendship ties to select outside directors to serve their own self-interest, increasing their 
own power and influence in their companies and exerting more personal influence on the 
firms’ decision making, and increasing their compensation (Hwang & Kim, 2009; 
Westphal, 1999).  To this end, an interesting question left open in the literature is: even if 
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managers actually use managerial ties and networks in their firms, will they use them in 
ways that serve their firms’ best interests or in self-interested ways to benefit themselves?  
The second study is specifically designed to shed light on this question of “how”.  
Particularly, I focus on an interesting managerial practice in declining firms, i.e., their 
ship-jumping behavior.  Ship jumping refers to upper-echelon administrators’ proactive 
and voluntary turnover prior to the crisis or decline of their firms (Boivie, Graffin, & 
Pollock, 2012; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 2008).  In 
declining firms endangered by crisis (e.g., huge financial loss, scandal, etc.), executives’ 
social capital may have two-fold implications. On the one hand, managerial social capital 
provides the firms valuable resources and social supports to manage and survive the 
decline (e.g., Daily, 1995; Fischer & Pollock, 2004, Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 
2001). On the other hand, executives’ social capital, as important source of information 
and social impact (Burt, 2001; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), may provide 
executives more opportunities to jump ship. Accordingly, executives in declining firms 
may choose to use their social capital in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, 
executives, as the strategic leader of their firms, may use their social capital to serve the 
best interest of their firms and prevent the decline. However, doing so may cause the 
executives’ personal losses such as tainted reputation and devaluation on labor market 
(Semadeni et al., 2008). On the other hand, executives may use their social capital to 
serve their best self-interest, searching for ship-jumping opportunities and abandoning the 
endangered firms. In such a manner, in a declining firm, an executive’s social capital 
tends to have paradoxical implications, either inhibiting or encouraging his/her ship-
jumping behavior. This dilemma leads to the following unanswered question: How would 
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executives’ social capital affect their ship-jumping behaviors in declining firms? By 
examining how executives’ social capital endowments affect their ship-jumping behavior, 
I explore the mechanisms behind the different ways in which they use their social capital. 
So what.  After addressing the question of “when” and “how”, the third question 
that is essential to the determination of the value of managers’ personal networks to their 
firms is “so what”, i.e., what would be the consequences, especially consequences that 
are not directly relevant to organizational performance, if managers have used their 
personal networks to support their organizations’ operation? Despite the strong 
advancements and thorough understanding about the positive implications of managerial 
network utilization for firms’ operation and performance (e.g., Acquaah, 2007; Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003; Hallen, 2008; Li et al., 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000; Shane & Cable, 2002; 
Uzzi, 1997), little effort has been devoted to examining other possible influences of 
managerial network utilization efforts on firms beyond their performance-boosting 
effects.   
Particularly, as a special operational practice, managerial network utilization may 
largely interact with other potential or actual operational practices and strategic choices 
of the focal firms (Child, 1997; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), thus incurring potential 
side effects on the focal firms’ operation along with its performance-boosting 
implications.  For example, drawing on the insight of social embeddedness (c.f., 
Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1999), scholars have shown that in business relationships built 
up on the basis of managers’ personal ties, both transactional parties face the normative 
pressures to act in accord with shared expectation, showing benevolence, trustworthiness 
and long-term orientation to each other (Uzzi, 1996; 1997; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003).  As 
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such, firms may be forced by such normative pressures of social embeddedness to act 
more generous and supportive to their business partners in personal tie-based transactions, 
and tend to be more hesitant to terminate such embedded business relationships (Gargiulo 
& Benassi, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Shane & Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1997).  To accurately 
comprehend the real value of managers’ personal ties and networks to their firms, it is 
necessary to understand these potential effects of managerial network utilization, rather 
than solely focusing on its influences directly related to organizational performance.   
The third study is designed to address these potential side effects of using 
managers’ personal networks to serve their firms.  I specifically test the relationships 
between two strategic alternatives—using entrepreneurs’ personal business and political 
ties and using opportunistic behaviors—that can both be adopted by new ventures to 
solve their intrinsic liability of newness, attempting to shed light on the non-performance 
effects of managerial network utilization. 
BASIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE THREE STUDIES 
I develop the three studies in following ways.  In Essay 1 (“when”), “Who you 
know and who you count on: A risk-taking model of entrepreneurs’ social tie utilization 
in venture fundraising”, I demonstrate that “having a tie” is different from “using a tie” 
for top managers.  My fundamental argument is that to entrepreneurs, having personal 
connections with investors may not necessarily equate to the effort to use these ties; 
instead, entrepreneurs may go through deliberate decision making process to determine 
whether or not to apply their entrepreneur-investor ties, as well as which ties to use.  That 
is, by activating their social ties with investors to raise funds, entrepreneurs intentionally 
take on a level of personal risk.  Specifically, using entrepreneur-investor ties to raise 
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funds for new ventures naturally attaches interpersonal norms and social exchange rules 
to the resulting venture-investment relationships (Uzzi, 1997, 1999).  On the positive side, 
entrepreneurs can draw on these relational norms to persuade or even obligate investors 
to whom they are personally connected to invest in their ventures.  However, these social 
norms and interpersonal codes reciprocally regulate both sides of the entrepreneur-
investor ties in use (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960).  As a result, by using their social ties to 
convince or obligate investors to invest, entrepreneurs also accept some personal risk.  
That is, when entrepreneurs successfully raise funds by using social ties and eventually 
the venture falls well short of investors’ expectations, the investors may perceive that the 
entrepreneurs violated the interpersonal codes of social exchange in securing the 
investment.  Therefore, the entrepreneurs may bear significant personal costs, such as 
damaged social ties and socioemotional losses (Batjargal et al., 2013; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, 
Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Jiang, Cannella, & Jiao, 2012).  As such, I argue that the 
activation of entrepreneur-investor ties in venture fundraising involves entrepreneurs’ 
personal risk taking, which, by nature, is determined by a deliberate decision-making 
process (Hogarth, 1989). 
Drawing on this insight, I highlight entrepreneurs’ decisions about using their 
personal social ties with investors in venture fundraising.  I posit that the personal risks 
borne by entrepreneurs who raise funds by making specific, personal appeals to investors 
with whom they have social ties are largely determined by two factors: the riskiness of 
the venture, linked to the obligation that investors (responding actors) take on by 
investing; and the strength of the tie being considered (tie strength), linked to the strength 
of norms governing the relationship.  I further capture the riskiness of venture investment 
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with two proxies: venture quality, which indicates the venture’s strategic capabilities and 
growth potential (Shepherd et al. 2000), and outcome extremeness, which indicates both 
the size of the investment at stake and the possibility of losing most or all of the 
investment (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).  Drawing insights from prospect theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1978, 1992) and the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998), I discuss how these factors (venture quality, outcome extremeness, 
and tie strength) respectively and jointly affect entrepreneurs’ choices regarding the 
activation of social ties with investors to raise funds for their ventures.   
In Essay 2 (“how”), “Strong enough to fight or strong enough to flee? Executive 
social capital and ship jumping in declining firms”, I attempt to shed light on the 
different ways in which top managers use managerial ties and networks in their firms.  
Prior studies have widely noticed that firms prefer to hire managers with high social 
status, which indicates the abundance of their managerial ties and networks (Finkelstein 
et al., 2009; Kim & Cannella, 2008).  However, as discussed, in declining firms, top 
managers can use these social capital endowments in two different ways.  They may 
either choose to stay and use their social capital to save their firms or opt for jumping 
ship through their social capital and abandoning their firms. I draw upon the perspective 
of resource dependence theory (RDT) to address this dilemma. Focusing on the 
interdependent relationships between actors, RDT posits that the dependence of an actor 
on other actors allows these stakeholders to exert some level of power over the focal 
actor and thus affect its decisions and actions (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
In their seminal study, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) posit that these interdependencies 
within and beyond an organization, and, consequently, the distribution of power and 
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control in the organization, both affect “the tenure and selection of major organizational 
administrators” (1978: 228). As such, RDT provides a natural theoretical perspective to 
examine executives’ ship-jumping behavior (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). 
Following the logic of RDT, I attribute executives’ ship-jumping behavior to two forms 
of dependencies, i.e., their external dependencies on the environmental context, and their 
internal dependencies on their firms. 
Prior studies suggest that a central incentive for executives to jump ship is to keep 
themselves from being personally stigmatized by their firms’ crisis (Semadeni et al., 
2008). In such a manner, I posit that executives may depend on taking external positions 
to avoid the potential stigma. In this regard, the social capital endowments of executives 
determine the degree of their external dependencies on these external positions. That is, 
as important components of executives’ social capital, these social contacts and networks 
can serve as a buffering mechanism that effectively mitigates the negative personal 
impact of firm crisis on executives (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, Hambrick, 2008; Zajonc, 
1980). Accordingly, executives with high social capital endowments depend less on 
taking new jobs to avoid stigmatization by the current firm. However, executives’ social 
capital also determines the feasibility of their external employment opportunities (Dess & 
Shaw, 2001; Smith et al., 2012). In such a manner, while low network endowment makes 
it more necessary for an executive to jump ship, it also confines his/her available 
opportunities of doing so. Taken together, I posit a non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) 
relationship between executives’ social capital endowment and their ship-jumping 
behavior. 
Meanwhile, executives also largely depend on the resource endowments of their 
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firms and the members in their firms (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Hillman et al., 2009). 
Particularly, executives largely depend on their firms, as well as their network 
endowments, to develop their social ties and networks (Westphal, Boivie, Chng, 2006; 
Zajac, 1988). These internal dependencies also tend to affect executives’ decision to jump 
ship. On the one hand, they determine the opportunity cost of ship-jumping behaviors, 
such that executives may lose important and otherwise irreplaceable identities and 
connections if they jump ship from firms with abundant social capital endowments. On 
the other hand, the social capital endowments of a firm also determine executives’ 
relative power and discretion within the firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1987), such that 
executives may be entrenched in firms with high social capital endowments because of 
the lack of decision discretion. Following this logic, I adopt two indicators for these 
internal dependencies, i.e., the peer social capital, which refers to the social capital 
endowments of other upper echelon administrators in a firm, and the interfirm network, 
which refers to the firm’s interfirm network endowments in the industrial network. I posit 
that both peer and interfirm network can reduce the likelihood of executive ship jumping 
behavior, as well as strengthen the effect of executives’ social capital on their ship-
jumping behavior. 
In the third study (“so what”), “The rationale of original sin: A behavioral model 
of new ventures’ opportunism”, I focus on the effects of entrepreneurs’ managerial 
network utilization on a prevalent practice among new ventures—opportunism.  I predict 
that managerial network utilization can intervene in entrepreneurs’ decision making of 
opportunism in their new ventures, significantly reducing new ventures’ opportunistic 
behaviors in business relationships.  I mainly base the theoretical framework of this study 
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on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) and behavioral 
agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  I posit that when perceiving high 
venture failure risks, entrepreneurs, as risk-aversive decision makers, tend to take risk 
and engage in opportunism in new ventures to save their new ventures from failing and 
avoid the perceived fixed venture failure loss.  However, if the focal entrepreneurs 
largely use their personal networks in their new ventures, they may personally bear the 
costs and risks of these opportunistic behaviors because of the strong connection between 
these entrepreneurs as individual social actors and their new ventures’ operational 
practices, thus making them more concerned to use opportunism to save their new 
ventures.  Plus, as strategic alternatives that can be used to address the intrinsic liability 
of newness, i.e., the extremely high venture failure risk (c.f., Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; 
Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986), managerial network utilization can reduce the necessity 
for new ventures to behave opportunistically, thus further confining their opportunism. 
THE THEORETICAL CONTINUITY OF THESE THREE STUDIES 
In essence, these three studies are all designed around a central issue—the 
decisions of managerial network utilization.  I mainly draw on the managers’ standpoint, 
examining their decision-making processes through which their managerial ties and 
networks can be applied in ways that actually benefit their firms.  As such, these three 
studies together construct a three-stage framework that fills the missing connections in 
the micro-macro link.   
The first study, “when”, explicitly demonstrates the difference between the 
network endowments managers possess and the activated network they use to contribute 
to their firms, thus providing direct support to the necessity of the whole dissertation 
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research.  Furthermore, they also provide a useful theoretical perspective as well as a 
series of indicators that can be used to determine which ties and networks owned by 
managers will they choose to use in different situations.  In such a manner, the first study 
will help to clarify the first key issue of accurately determining the practical value of 
managerial ties and networks to their firms, i.e., which managerial ties and networks 
would be relevant to the focal firms.   
The second study, “how”, is logically consequent on the first study.  Namely, only 
those managerial network using efforts that are conducted in accord with their firms’ best 
interests are valuable and desirable for the focal firms and can actually contribute to the 
construction of the micro-macro link.  As such, by exploring the different ways in which 
different managerial network endowments can be used in firms, the second study 
contributes to accurately assessing the practical value of managerial ties and networks by 
further clarifying the second key issue, i.e., to what extent would these managerial ties 
and networks be used in ways that are desirable and valuable to the focal firms. 
The third study, “so what”, posits how managers’ personal network utilization 
may potentially affect their other strategic decisions.  Even if managers actually use 
managerial ties and networks on behalf of their firms, these efforts may not necessarily 
lead to beneficial consequences for firms.  In such a manner, it is necessary to understand 
the possible side effects and opportunity costs of managerial network utilization.  As such, 
the third study completes the logic chain of the determination of practical value of 
managers’ personal ties and networks by clarifying the third key issue, i.e., what would 
be the possible side effects and opportunity costs if managers actually use managerial 
ties and networks to benefit heir firms. 
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Taken together, these three studies compose an integrative theoretical chain in a 
logically stepwise way, i.e., which ties and networks would be in use ! to what extent 
would they be used in valuable ways for the focal firms ! what would be the opportunity 
costs of their favorable performance implications (see Figure 1).  In such a manner, the 
three studies together open the black box of the micro-macro link, shedding light on in 
ways in which the practical value of managerial ties and networks to their firms can be 
determined. 
METHODS 
In this first study, I used the high-tech ventures in Beijing as the research setting, 
examining the venture investments between start-up stage ventures registered in Beijing 
and local venture capital (VC) firms.  I chose this research setting for several reasons.  I 
chose start-up stage ventures because the start-up stage typically follows successful 
prototype or business model development and testing and the start-up is designed to 
generate the first production for sale (Ruhnka & Young, 1987; Sahlman, 1990; Tyebjee 
& Bruno, 1984).  Therefore, start-up ventures have few established business connections 
and visible achievements, thus reducing the potential confounding effects from signals of 
venture quality that are accessible to VCs (Hallen, 2008).  Likewise, choosing high-tech 
ventures registered in Beijing ensures the similarity in venture scope and geographic 
location, leading to consistency in environmental factors (industrial and business policy, 
regional economic development, infrastructure conditions, etc.). 
Second, most Chinese VC firms are located in larger cities, like Beijing and 
Shanghai (Batjargal, 2007; Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009; Lu, 
Tan, & Huang, 2011).  Also, as the center of the high-tech industrial cluster in Northern 
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China, Beijing has preferential institutional and market environments, which encourage 
the participation of both entrepreneurs and investors (Chinese Yearbook, 2012).  To this 
end, the research setting provides abundant ventures and investors clustering in a 
geographically restricted region.  The spatial proximity of ventures and investors leads to 
a relatively dense entrepreneur-investor network, which naturally allows the 
establishment and maintenance of embedded social ties between entrepreneurs and VCs.  
Therefore, the research setting of local venture investment is well suited to the 
phenomenon of interest in this study . 
Our data collection included two annual surveys, one in 2011 and one in 2012.  
Both surveys were distributed after the Chinese Spring Festival (in March of 2011 and 
February of 2012).  Because many Chinese firms close their fiscal years before the 
Chinese Spring Festival rather than before the calendar year, the timing helped us to 
capture complete information about local venture investments made during the previous 
year.  In each survey, I used the official reports and records from the Beijing 
Administration for Industry and Commerce and the Beijing Municipal Bureau of 
Financial Work to identify VC firms registered and operating in Beijing (I identified 67 
in 2010 and 70 in 2011).  With the assistance of local government and the local venture 
capital association, I approached these VCs asking for their agreement to participate in 
this study.  There were 43 firms in 2011 and 41 in 2012 that agreed to participate.  To 
check for potential nonresponse bias, I compared the participating VC firms with non-
participating ones in terms of their registered asset size and the number of investments 
they made, and found no significant differences on these dimensions.  Then, I surveyed 
the CEOs/managing partners in these VC firms about their venture investment actions 
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during the previous year in the district. 
Importantly, in the venture financing process, each venture only receives 
investment from a small number of VC firms, and likewise, each VC firm can only 
evaluate and then invest in a limited number of new ventures (Hallen, 2008; Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001, 2008).  As a result, it has been widely recognized in the venture financing 
literature that relative to the population of all possible venture-VC dyads, the successful 
formation of investment ties between ventures and VCs is a rare event (Batjargal & Liu, 
2004; Hallen, 2008; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  For this reason, using all possible dyads 
between the VC firms and the start-up stage ventures to test the hypotheses would have 
yielded biased estimates, because using logistic regression to account for rare events 
tends to underestimate coefficients for factors that predict positive outcomes (King & 
Zeng, 2001).  Moreover, intuitively, VC firms do not invest in ventures that they have not 
evaluated.  For these reasons, I restricted the sample to venture-VC dyads in which VCs 
actually evaluated the ventures as potential investment targets. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Hallen, 2008; Jensen, 2003), 
I adopted a choice-based sampling technique (Manski & Lerman, 1977; Manski & 
McFadden, 1981; McFadden, 1980).  To identify the sample new ventures, I asked the 
VC survey participants to identify all the start-up stage new ventures they had evaluated 
in the previous year in the district.  This process identified 167 ventures in the 2011 
survey and 159 ventures in the 2012 survey.  All sample ventures were private firms.  To 
ensure the representativeness of this choice-based sample, I compared these sample 
ventures and a set (500) of randomly-chosen high-tech ventures in China in terms of their 
registered asset size, number of employees, and firm age, and found no statistically 
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significant differences on these dimensions.  After sending out a request to participate to 
the ventures identified above, 124 ventures in 2011 and 109 ventures in 2012 agreed to 
participate in this study.  Comparing the participating ventures with non-participating 
ones, I found no significant differences on their registered asset size, number of 
employees, or firm age.  This process led to 427 venture-VC dyads in the 2011 survey 
and 389 in the 2012 survey, which in total included 89 actual investment dyads – 
ventures funded by VC firms (42 in 2011 and 47 in 2012) – and 727 non-investment 
dyads – VCs that evaluated a sample venture but did not fund it.  These 816 effective 
dyads composed the final choice-based sample.  The 89 investment dyads involved 84 
sample ventures (i.e., three ventures received investments from two VCs and one venture 
received investments from three VCs).  For each sample venture, I asked its major 
strategic leader (CEOs, general managers, board chairs, etc.) about new venture and 
his/her social ties with sample venture capitalists.   
All surveys were conducted via structured interviews.  The authors conducted 
face-to-face interviews with all sample VC firms and 89 sample ventures (38 in 2011 and 
56 in 2012). Trained interviewers were hired to conduct the telephone interviews with the 
remaining sample ventures in the company of the research assistants.   
In the second study, I chose the specially treated public firms in Chinese stock 
market provide as the empirical setting to test the theory. In May 2003, China launched 
the revised delisting risk monitoring system, mandating that if a publicly listed company 
reports accounting losses in two consecutive years, its stock will be put under special 
treatment (ST for short) for delisting risk warning and listed with the prefix of “*ST” 
(Jiang & Wang, 2008). *ST stocks are subject to special trading and financial restrictions. 
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For example, the daily stock price movement for an ST stock cannot exceed 5% in either 
direction. Moreover, the ST stock will not be allowed to raise additional capital from the 
stock market. After a stock is prefixed with *ST, it will be suspended from public trading 
after the company reports one more annual loss, and delisted after two. In contrast, the 
company will be able to remove the *ST prefix if its performance is significantly 
improved after the *ST filing. Drawing on this insight, in Chinese stock market, the *ST 
filing indicates both the current decline of a company’s performance and the high risk of 
its stock market failure in the future. As such, a company’s *ST announcement is a strong 
and publicly accessible signal indicating its declining tendency (Zhou, 2013). Moreover, 
since the *ST filing requires two consecutive annual financial loss, it naturally allows 
executives to proactively jump ship before the filing.  
I collected longitudinal data about 248 publicly listed Chinese companies whose 
stock was prefixed with *ST (*ST companies for short) from 2004 to 2011. The data was 
collected from two leading Chinese stock market data providers, i.e., WIND Information, 
and CSMAR Solution. I excluded *ST companies that experienced reverse merger from 
the sample. Reverse merger, or “Mai Ke (买壳)” in Chinese, refers to the following 
practice. A private company takes control of an *ST company by buying its stock 
(usually 70% to 90%), and then makes the decision for the *ST company to acquire the 
private firm. Doing this will allow the *ST company to reorganize and turnover by using 
superior assets of the private firm, and the private firm to get access to public capital in 
the stock market. It has been acknowledged that reversed mergers will often lead to major 
change in top management teams before and after *ST filing and thus confound the 
findings (Darrough, Huang, & Zhao, 2013). This exclusion narrowed the sample size 
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down to 122 *ST firms.  
Following prior studies (e.g., Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Semadeni et al., 2008), for 
each sample *ST company, I examined the year-end reports for each sample *ST 
company, identifying its major executives, i.e., the CEO, CFO, president, and executive 
vice president as the sample executives. In total, this method leads to a sample of 278 
executives of the 122 *ST companies.  
In the third study, I chose the computer and communication equipment 
manufacturing industry in three southeast provinces in China as the research setting. I 
chose this setting for several reasons. First, the computer and communication equipment 
manufacturing industry is dominated by new ventures in China (Dowling & McGee, 
1994; McDougall, 1989; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Second, according to official 
industrial reports (China yearbook, 2011), the industry in these three provinces is well 
established, including relatively complete industrial value chains, well-developed 
infrastructures, and strong connections and cooperation between firms and research 
institutes (c.f., Porter, 1985). These munificent environments further encourage 
entrepreneurial actions (Venkataraman, 1997). Additionally (and important for the 
methodology), opportunistic behavior can be judged most objectively and accurately by 
external stakeholders who have relational experience with the firms in question (c.f., 
Carson et al., 2006; Luo, 2007). Using participant firms in the same region and same 
industry allows us to capture intra-industry networks across sample firms and, 
accordingly, use these networks to locate qualified informant firms to evaluate the extent 
of new venture opportunism.  
The data collection process was conducted from February 2010 to October 2011. I 
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began by conducting 25 interviews (with 16 top managers in computer and 
communication equipment manufacturing firms and 9 executives in industrial 
associations) to ensure the content validity of the survey items. Interviewees were asked 
to check the relevance and completeness of the items based on their industrial experience 
and personal perceptions. Based on their responses and suggestions, I made minor 
adjustments to several items to enhance their content validity in the research setting. With 
the adjusted survey, I then conducted a pilot study with 69 top managers in the three 
sample provinces and finalized the items used in the formal survey. 
The data collection process included multiple stages and involved both 
established firms and new ventures. First, with the assistance of a government-funded 
national research institution, I secured access to a directory including the total 4,386 
firms registered in the communication equipment manufacturing industry in the three 
provinces. I contacted all 4,386 firms to request their CEOs or general managers to 
indicate at least 3 firms with which they have or have had business relationships or of 
which they are aware as participants in their industry. After a follow-up reminder, I 
received 329 responses, with each response nominating at least 3 firms. As a result, these 
respondents nominated a total of 631 individual firms, where 187 firms (29.6%) were 
nominated more than once. I used these 631 firms as the survey sample frame.  
Prior entrepreneurship studies in China have commonly defined new ventures as 
firms younger than 5 years (e.g., Li & Zhang, 2007; Zhao & Aram, 1995). The 
interviewees from both firms and industrial associations largely consented to this 
criterion for identifying new ventures in computer and communication equipment 
industry in China. As such I defined new ventures as firms founded within the past 5 
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years. Following this definition, 206 out the 631 sample firms were classified as new 
ventures. The average age was 12.23 years (SD=5.69) for all participant firms (including 
both new ventures and established firms), and 2.18 years (SD=2.01) for sample new 
ventures.  
After identifying the survey participants, I conducted the next round of surveys. 
To avoid consistency biases that may exist when both independent and dependent 
variables are collected at the same time (c.f., Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), I used a 
temporally lagged design involving two time periods, collecting explanatory variables at 
Time 1 and predictor variables at Time 2 (approximately five months later). All sample 
firms received the same Time 1 survey, capturing some independent variables such as 
low legitimacy, information unverifiability and institutional inefficacy. As I will describe 
below, resource scarcity was captured from archival data. At Time 2, I adopted two 
different versions of the survey, such that new ventures were only asked to report their 
utilization of their leaders’ personal ties and networks, while established firms were 
asked to report their business partners’ opportunism. This separation of informants is 
designed to reduce self-report bias in the assessment of opportunism. Preliminary tests of 
the Time 2 survey data showed that new ventures have a higher opportunism propensity 
than established firms (t=2.78, p<0.01), but their use of managerial networks was not 
different from that of established firms (t=1.32, ns.). 
A total of 606 sample firms (96.0%) made effective responses to both Time 1 and 
Time 2 surveys, including 201 new ventures (97.6%) and 405 established firms (95.3%). 
These sample new ventures and established firms showed no significant difference with 
the non-responding ventures and established firms in their average age, scale of 
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registered capital and number of employees. I used the 201 new ventures as the final 
sample for theoretical testing, and using the information from the 405 established firms to 
assess the opportunism and resource scarcity of the sample ventures and crosscheck the 
reliability of the answers from sample ventures. 
EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS 
Together as a doctoral dissertation, these three studies contribute to prior 
managerial network and managerial social capital research by specifically anatomizing 
the “micro-macro links” between managerial ties and networks as managers’ personal 
endowments and their instrumental value to the focal firms as economic organizations 
(c.f., Li et al., 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000), and therefore help to answer the to date 
understudied question: to what extent can firms actually benefit from the managerial 
ties and networks of their top managers.   
As discussed earlier, management and organizational scholars so far have almost 
exclusively treated the favorable implications of managerial ties and networks for firms 
in a taken-for-grant way, barely attempting to open the black box of the actual process 
through which the value of these personal endowments of managers can be realized at the 
organizational level.  By systematically anatomizing the potential relationship between 
the micro and the macro end of such “micro-macro link” into three logically consequent 
questions (i.e., which ties and networks would be in use, to what extent would they be 
used in value-creating ways for the focal firms, and what would be the opportunity costs 
of their favorable performance implications), and drawing on the insight of behavioral 
decision making theories to fill these blanks by closely examining managers’ personal 
decision making processes, these studies provide an exploratory theoretical framework 
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that can be used by future studies to determine the practical value of managers’ personal 
ties and networks to their organizations, complementing the extant managerial network 
and managerial social capital research by developing an “inner” perspective to examine 
the “micro-macro links”. 
Plus, by specifying the three major theoretical questions in specific research 
settings, the three studies also respectively contribute to their specific research domains.  
To name a few, the first study, “Who you know and who you count on: A risk-taking 
model of entrepreneurs’ social tie utilization in venture fundraising”, contributes to 
network research by theoretically and empirically justifying the differentiation between 
“having a tie” from “using a tie”, and advances venture financing research by provides a 
new behavioral theory perspective to examine venture investment process.  The second 
study, “Strong enough to fight or strong enough to flee? Executive social capital and 
ship jumping in declining firms”, contributes to strategic leadership research by bridging 
across social capital theory and resource dependence theory in studying executives’ 
turnover (c.f., Carpenter et al., 2012; Ibarra et al., 2005; Khatri et al., 2006; Portes, 1998), 
and shows the applicability of an alternative perspective to examine agent-principal 
relationships, that is, bridging the self-interest assumption of agency theory and the 
altruism assumption of stewardship theory, which have been mainly contrasted in prior 
studies (c.f., Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  The third study, “The rationale of original 
sin: A behavioral model of new ventures’ opportunism”, largely complements the extant 
opportunism research by shedding light on the unsolved question as mentioned, i.e., the 
possible reason and mechanisms underlying firms’ opportunistic behaviors.  Also, it 
sheds light on the unexpected consequences of an understudied managerial decision of 
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their social network utilizations on their other decisions.  These specific contributions 
will be listed in each paper in detail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WHO YOU KNOW AND WHO YOU COUNT ON: A RISK-TAKING MODEL OF 
ENTREPRENEURS’ SOCIAL TIE UTILIZATION IN VENTURE FUNDRAISING 
  
	  30 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a broad consensus in prior network studies that actors can capture 
important benefits from their social contacts (i.e., Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Burt, 
1997; Lin, 2001).  Given their beneficial implications, actors’ social ties have generally 
been treated as valuable personal endowments.  Accordingly, researchers have focused a 
good deal of attention on identifying the value of social ties and understanding the 
mechanisms behind realizing that value (Kilduff & Brass, 2010).   
However, a subtle yet critical fact about social ties is that being connected to 
another does not necessarily mean that an actor will intentionally activate the connection 
(Carpenter, Li, & Jiang, 2012).  Specifically, it has been well-established in prior network 
research that the activation of social ties is accompanied by certain costs and risks (e.g., 
Granovetter, 1985; Portes, 1996, 2000; Putnam, 1995).  For example, norms of 
reciprocity attached to social ties implies that actors who activate ties accept a level of 
social indebtedness in doing so (Gouldner, 1960; Yang, 1994).  Failure to appropriately 
reciprocate violates interpersonal norms and jeopardizes the ties, thus incurring potential 
losses of social capital, reputation, affective commitment, and so on (Blau 1964).  For 
this reason, by activating social ties, actors sometimes accept personal risks and to avoid 
these risks, they may sometimes avoid activating their social ties (Carpenter et al., 2012).  
Drawing on this insight, to unveil the extent to which actors actually benefit from their 
social ties, it is important to understand the decision-making process behind tie activation.  
However, with few exceptions ( Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Levin, Walter, & Murnighan, 
2011; Smith, Menon, & Thompson, 2012), prior studies have ignored the issues behind 
tie activation, implicitly assuming that actors will always use the ties they have.   
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I believe that understanding the decision-making process behind social tie 
activation is especially important for managerial social ties, i.e., managers’ interpersonal 
contacts (kinship ties, friendship ties, personal acquaintance, etc.) with external 
stakeholders.  Scholars have widely highlighted the beneficial implications of managerial 
networks in securing access to external resources (Acquaah, 2007; Collins & Clark, 2003; 
Peng & Luo, 2000).  However, as I have explained, managers may avoid using their 
social ties to secure resources for their firms.  Particularly, as direct participants in their 
networks, managers may personally bear some costs when using their personal contacts 
on behalf of their firms.  As such, it is reasonable to expect that managers will be 
cautious about and may sometimes intentionally avoid using their social ties to seek 
resources for their firms.  Building on this notion, to fully understand the contributions of 
managerial social ties and networks to firms, it is necessary to highlight the decision-
making process behind managers’ social tie activation and specifically differentiate 
between “having a managerial social tie” and “using this tie to secure resources for firms”.   
Against this backdrop, I focus on a special case of managers deciding whether or 
not to use their personal social ties to benefit their firms – entrepreneurs in the process of 
new venture fundraising.  I chose this setting for several reasons.  First, entrepreneurs’ 
social contacts are particularly valuable for new ventures, nearly all of which suffer from 
significant liabilities of newness (Li & Zhang; Liu, Li, Hesterly, & Cannella, 2011).  For 
this reason, entrepreneurs are strongly motivated to activate their personal social ties as 
they seek venture funding.  Second, entrepreneurs tend to have relatively high risk 
propensity and risk tolerance (Stewart & Roth, 2001), therefore potentially making them 
more likely to accept any personal risks associated with using their social ties to support 
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their ventures.  Third, the new venture setting is one in which the responding actors 
(those secured through social tie activation) must accept significant risk in responding.  
As such, the risks of tie activation are important for managers in this setting because if 
the venture fails, the responding actors (the investors) will place blame squarely on the 
requesting actor (the entrepreneur).  For these reasons, the setting has all the critical 
characteristics necessary for testing the difference between having a tie and using a tie.   
Our basic argument is that by activating their social ties with investors to raise 
funds, entrepreneurs intentionally take on a level of personal risk.  Specifically, using 
entrepreneur-investor ties to raise funds for new ventures naturally attaches interpersonal 
norms and social exchange rules to the resulting venture-investment relationships (Uzzi, 
1997, 1999).  On the positive side, entrepreneurs can draw on these relational norms to 
persuade or even obligate investors to whom they are personally connected to invest in 
their ventures.  However, these social norms and interpersonal codes reciprocally regulate 
both sides of the entrepreneur-investor ties in use (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960).  As a 
result, by using their social ties to convince or obligate investors to invest, entrepreneurs 
also accept some personal risk.  That is, when entrepreneurs successfully raise funds by 
using social ties and eventually the venture falls well short of investors’ expectations, the 
investors may perceive that the entrepreneurs violated the interpersonal codes of social 
exchange in securing the investment.  Therefore, the entrepreneurs may bear significant 
personal costs, such as damaged social ties and socioemotional losses (Batjargal et al., 
2013; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Jiang, Cannella, & Jiao, 2012).  
As such, I argue that the activation of entrepreneur-investor ties in venture fundraising 
involves entrepreneurs’ personal risk taking, which, by nature, is determined by a 
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deliberate decision-making process (Hogarth, 1989). 
Drawing on this insight, I highlight entrepreneurs’ decisions about using their 
personal social ties with investors in venture fundraising.  I posit that the personal risks 
borne by entrepreneurs who raise funds by making specific, personal appeals to investors 
with whom they have social ties are largely determined by two factors: the riskiness of 
the venture, linked to the obligation that investors (responding actors) take on by 
investing; and the strength of the tie being considered (tie strength), linked to the strength 
of norms governing the relationship.  I further capture the riskiness of venture investment 
with two proxies: venture quality, which indicates the venture’s strategic capabilities and 
growth potential (Shepherd et al.  2000), and outcome extremeness, which indicates both 
the size of the investment at stake and the possibility of losing most or all of the 
investment (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).  Drawing insights from prospect theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1978 1992) and the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998), I discuss how these factors (venture quality, outcome extremeness, 
and tie strength) respectively and jointly affect entrepreneurs’ choices regarding the 
activation of social ties with investors to raise funds for their ventures.   
This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways.  First, I emphasize 
an understudied topic – the difference between having a tie and using a tie, or more 
broadly, the network an actor participates in, and his/her efforts to apply this network 
toward instrumental ends (Carpenter et al., 2012).  By specifically demonstrating the 
theoretical and practical differences between having a tie and using a tie, this study 
contributes to network research by establishing the necessity of considering multiple 
forms of networks (e.g., “the potential network an actor participates in” and “the utilized 
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or activated network the actor actually applies”) especially in studies focusing on the 
implications of social ties and networks.  Second, this study also contributes to the 
strategic leadership literature by considering the following unanswered question: To what 
extent do firms benefit from their managers’ personal social ties and networks?  
Researchers have commonly treated the personal ties and networks of managers as 
endowments of their firms (Kilduff & Brass, 2010).  However, prior research varies 
significantly in the explanatory power of managerial personal ties and networks on their 
beneficial implications for firms (Carpenter et al., 2012).  By showing that managers may 
not necessarily use their personal ties on behalf of their firms, this study provides an 
explanation for the mixed evidence about the implications of managerial personal ties and 
networks.  Lastly, using behavioral decision theory to highlight the risk-taking behind tie 
activation in securing venture investment, this study provides a socio-psychological 
perspective for studying venture investment that goes beyond and complements prevalent 
theoretical approaches in prior venture finance research, such as transaction cost analysis 
(e.g., Sahlman, 1990) and agency theory (e.g., Gompers, 1996).   
MANAGERIAL TIE ACTIVATION: FROM WHO YOU KNOW TO WHO YOU 
COUNT ON 
Fundraising efforts represent an essential yet challenging entrepreneurial task 
(Zhang, Souitaris, Soh, & Wong, 2008).  Financially constrained ventures often rely on 
their leaders’ personal connections to secure needed funds (Baron & Markman, 2000; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Uzzi, 1996).  The social exchange norms of mutual obligation, 
mutual support and interpersonal affect embedded in these social ties may allow 
entrepreneurs to motivate actors to whom they are personally tied to be more supportive 
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and generous toward the ventures (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998; Uzzi, 1999).  Using 
this logic, scholars have widely argued that entrepreneur-investor ties can significantly 
facilitate venture fundraising (Cable & Shane, 1997; Uzzi, 1996).   
The predicted beneficial implications of social ties for venture financing reflects 
the logic of social embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997, 1999), which emphasizes that “commercial 
transactions take place through social relationships and networks of relationships that use 
exchange protocols associated with social, noncommercial attachments to govern 
business dealings” (Uzzi, 1999: 482).  Uzzi describes how the interpersonal norms and 
affection involved in managerial personal ties affect interfirm relationships, inclining 
firms to act toward each other like “...a ‘relief organization’ for the other firms in its 
network.  The stronger firms in the network may dedicate resources to weaker members 
at a rate that outpaces their capacity to rejuvenate their own resources “ (1997: 59).  This 
logic suggests that managers can draw on the norms of mutual support and mutual 
obligation and the interpersonal affection embedded in their social ties to persuade or 
obligate others to be more generous and supportive in interfirm transactions, therefore 
facilitating their access to valuable external resources (Gulati, 1995; Shane & Cable; Uzzi, 
1996).   
However, having valuable social ties does not necessarily mean that a manager 
will use these ties to seek resources for their firms (Carpenter et al., 2012; Nadler, 1987; 
Smith, Smith, & Bliss, 2011).  As discussed earlier, by using their social ties to conduct 
interfirm transactions, managers potentially accept some personal risks.  That is, by 
attaching the relational norms and interpersonal affect to interfirm relationships and 
regulating economic transactions with these interpersonal codes, managers intertwine 
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their social ties with interfirm transactions.  As a result, any undesired outcomes 
occurring in the transactions may be perceived as violating the interpersonal norms 
regulating social ties, leaving the managers personally bearing some responsibility for the 
undesired outcomes.  Accordingly, the manager may suffer from consequent personal 
loss of social capital and socioemotional well-being, such as loss of valuable social 
contacts, tainted reputation, damaged social identity, and so on (Blau, 1964; Jiang et al., 
2012).  Following this logic, it is reasonable to predict that managers will be cautious 
about using their personal social ties to secure resources for their firms.   
Regarding the beneficial effects of entrepreneur-investor ties on venture 
fundraising, the distinction between having a tie and using a tie has particular 
implications.  Specifically, given the risky nature of the context, venture investment 
naturally involves the acceptance of significant risk on the part of investors (Amit, 
Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  As such, by activating their 
personal ties to raise funds for their ventures, entrepreneurs draw on the relational norms 
and interpersonal affective commitments attached to those social ties to convince or 
obligate investors to take risk by investing in their ventures.  Consequently, entrepreneurs 
also accept some personal risks:  When an entrepreneur uses a personal tie to raise funds 
and the venture significantly underperforms or fails, the investor may feel personally 
violated because the entrepreneur drew on the personal connection to secure the 
investor’s commitment.  Accordingly, the investor is likely to blame the entrepreneur for 
misrepresenting the venture and for taking advantage of their personal relationship, thus 
causing the potential loss of the entrepreneur’s personal social capital and socioemotional 
wealth.  Therefore, it is natural that entrepreneurs will exercise significant care in making 
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decisions about using personal social ties to raise funds for their ventures.  Taken 
together, I posit that using entrepreneur-investor ties in venture fundraising intrinsically 
represents entrepreneurs’ taking personal risks on behalf of their ventures. 
In sum, I argue that for entrepreneurs, having social ties with investors does not 
necessarily equate to the activation of those ties in venture fundraising.  Rather, using 
these ties to raise funds reflects entrepreneurs’ personal risk taking, which is the outcome 
of a deliberate decision-making process (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992).  Next, I will highlight the decision mechanisms through which entrepreneurs 
determine whether or not to take personal risks and activate their social ties in venture 
fundraising. 
A RISK-TAKING MODEL OF TIE ACTIVATION IN VENTURE 
FUNDRAISING 
The elements of personal risk involved in using entrepreneur-investor ties 
Risk is generally defined as a condition in which decision makers can assign 
possibilities to probable outcomes (for historical context, see Knight, 1921; Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1970; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947).  In managerial decision-making 
contexts, this general notion of “risk” includes several elements, with distinct 
implications for decision-making (March & Shapira, 1987; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; 
Shapira, 1995).  Therefore, I disaggregate the elements of risk to highlight the 
mechanisms behind the personal risk-taking of entrepreneurs. 
Based on the above discussion, using social ties in venture fundraising is 
personally risky for entrepreneurs, because they draw on the interpersonal norms and 
affection to convince or obligate their personal contacts (investors) to accept significant 
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risk.  By nature, these interpersonal codes reciprocally regulate both sides of the social 
ties in use (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960; Yang, 1994).  Therefore, when entrepreneurs 
successfully raise funds by using social ties and the venture’s performance falls well 
short of investors’ expectations, the entrepreneurs are likely to be perceived as having 
violated the norms of interpersonal exchange and therefore as personally culpable for the 
original investment decision.  Using this logic, I posit that the personal risk borne by 
entrepreneurs in activating social ties is naturally determined by two factors: (1) the scale 
of the risk they convince their social ties (investors) to accept, and (2) the strength of 
relational norms they draw on.  As I will describe, the scale of the risk is represented by 
the riskiness of the requested venture investment, and the strength of the relational norms 
is represented by the strength of the tie in use (Carpenter et al., 2012). 
I argue that the riskiness of the requested venture investment and entrepreneur-
investor tie strength together shape the potential personal risks related to the use of social 
ties.  On the one hand, the riskier the requested venture investment, the more likely the 
venture may dramatically underperform, thus making the entrepreneur more likely to be 
personally blamed by the investors.  On the other hand, the stronger the entrepreneur-
investor tie that is activated, the stronger the interpersonal norms and affection drawn 
upon, and the more likely that the entrepreneur will be perceived as personally 
responsible for any bad outcomes, and the more social capital and socioemotional wealth 
that is put at risk (Jiang et al., 2012).  Next, I will discuss how the riskiness of the venture 
and entrepreneur-investor tie strength affect entrepreneurs’ decision of social tie 
activation in venture fundraising. 
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The riskiness of the requested venture investment 
According to prospect theory, risk includes two components: the probability of 
gain/loss, and the significance or magnitude of possible outcomes (Fishburn, 1988; 
Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990).  Following this logic, I adopt two concepts to capture the 
riskiness of a venture investment: venture quality, which indicates the likelihood of 
failure to meet return expectations, and outcome extremeness, which indicates the scale 
and variance of investment outcomes (“big losses versus big wins”).   
Venture quality.  Venture quality, as reflected by ventures’ founding team 
capabilities, strategy, and growth potential (Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd, Douglas, & 
Shanley, 2000; Thornhill & Amit, 2003), is naturally linked to venture performance and 
survival.  Low-quality ventures are more likely to underperform or fail and less likely to 
produce high returns for investors (Brealey & Myers, 1996; Hall & Hofer, 1993).  As 
such, it is of higher personal risk for entrepreneurs to use their personal social ties to raise 
funds for low-quality ventures.   
In addition, venture investors, as rational actors, naturally focus their investments 
on those ventures that are expected to produce high returns, so low-quality ventures are 
of lesser attractiveness to investors (Brealey & Myers, 1996; Hall & Hofer, 1993).  
Therefore, when entrepreneurs successfully raise funds for low-quality ventures using 
their social ties, the investments are more likely to be based on investors’ interpersonal 
obligations to the entrepreneurs and less likely to be based on the rational calculation of 
the ventures’ value as investment targets.  As such, investors will be more likely to blame 
the entrepreneurs personally for undesired outcomes.   
Taken together, I posit that it is personally more risky for entrepreneurs to use 
	  40 
their social ties with investors to raise funds for their ventures when the ventures are of 
low quality.  Accordingly, entrepreneurs tend to be more hesitant about activating their 
entrepreneur-investor ties when their ventures are of low quality. 
H1a: Venture quality is positively related to the likelihood that entrepreneurs 
will activate their personal social ties in venture fundraising. 
Outcome extremeness.  The extremeness of a risky situation reflects the range of 
variance in the expected payoff, indicating the likelihood of significant gain/loss, i.e., 
“big loss and big win” (Hogarth, 1989; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Tversky & Simonson, 
1993).  The concept of extremeness captures two important facets of a risky situation: the 
amount at stake, and the likelihood of extraordinary loss.  Accordingly, in this study I 
define outcome extremeness as the variance of expected investment outcomes, which 
arises from both the scale of investment and the possibility of losing most or all of it 
(Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). 
I posit that high outcome extremeness tends to discourage entrepreneurs from 
using their social ties in venture fundraising.  It has been noted that decision makers are 
naturally averse to options with high extremeness in outcomes (Simonson & Tversky, 
1992; Tversky & Simonson, 1993).  Given this tendency of extremeness aversion, 
investors tend to be more concerned and cautious about highly extreme investments 
(Ruhnka & Young, 1991; Slovic, 1995).  For this reason, entrepreneurs might need to 
rely more heavily on the interpersonal affection and relational norms embedded in their 
social ties to secure needed investments for ventures of high outcome extremeness.  
Moreover, it has been widely noted that actors are more likely to attribute large failures to 
external factors (Feather, 1969; Streufert & Streufert, 1969; Vaara, 2002).  For these 
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reasons, investors are more likely to blame entrepreneurs personally for any extreme 
losses from investments secured through social ties.  Taken together, I posit that it is 
personally more risky for entrepreneurs to use social ties for ventures of high outcome 
extremeness, which in turn discourages entrepreneurs from using social ties in those 
settings.   
H1b: Outcome extremeness is negatively related to the likelihood that 
entrepreneurs will activate their personal social ties in venture 
fundraising. 
Interaction between venture quality and outcome extremeness.  With regard to 
the two elements of risk, i.e., the probability and the magnitude of possible outcomes, 
scholars have argued that they will often have interactive effects as well as main effects 
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990; March & Shapira, 1987).  Prospect theory predicts that the 
possible gain/loss (as the product of the probability and magnitude of possible outcomes) 
affects how decision makers frame a situation, which in turn affects their choices 
(Fishburn, 1988; Fleishman, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).  Specifically, 
entrepreneurs, as loss-averse decision makers, tend to be more risk averse if they frame 
the alternative as a likely gain, and more risk seeking if they frame the alternative as a 
likely loss (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
Following this logic, I posit that venture quality and outcome extremeness may 
interact to jointly affect decisions about using social ties in venture fundraising.  That is, 
when their ventures are of high quality and have high outcome extremeness, 
entrepreneurs are more likely to frame the likely outcome as a gain (Forlani & Mullins, 
2000).  Therefore, they may be more averse to taking the personal risks associated with 
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using social ties to raise funds.  Further, high-quality ventures are more likely to attract 
investment (Batjargal & Liu, 2004).  As such, leaders of high-quality ventures may be 
able to secure even extreme-outcome investments without drawing on their social ties and 
accepting potential personal risk.  Following this logic, I predict that high venture quality 
coupled with high outcome extremeness tends to make entrepreneurs less likely to use 
their social ties. 
In contrast, for low-quality ventures, entrepreneurs are more likely to frame the 
alternative to using social ties as venture failure (Jiang et al., 2012).  In this setting, 
entrepreneurs are likely to become risk-seeking, perhaps “grasping at straws” to avoid 
venture failure (Hannafey, 2003).  Moreover, low venture quality constrains venture 
fundraising, and coupled with high outcome extremeness tends to make investments very 
difficult to secure without the use of social ties.  Taken together, I expect that 
entrepreneurs will be motivated by low venture quality to accept more personal risk by 
using social ties to secure extreme outcome investments, gambling on the “big wins” that 
these investments promise.  Thus, I predict that: 
H2: Venture quality will positively moderate (strengthen) the negative effect 
of outcome extremeness on the likelihood of activating social ties to 
secure venture investment. 
The strength of entrepreneur-investor ties 
As a central feature of social relationships, tie strength reflects the interaction 
intensity and mutual commitment between relational partners (Krackhardt, 1992; 
Marsden & Campbell, 1984).  Granovetter defined tie strength as “a (probably linear) 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
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confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (1973: 1361).  
Therefore, tie strength represents the shared time and experience, mutual belongingness 
and trustworthiness, and perceived obligation of benevolence and mutual support 
between actors, capturing the strength of interpersonal norms and the extent of affective 
commitments involved in their social ties (Coleman, 1990; Granovetter, 1985). 
In venture fundraising, the strength of entrepreneur-investor ties in use has two 
implications.  First, as the strength of a tie increases, the entrepreneur and investor both 
tend to perceive a stronger normative obligation to act for mutual benefit (Emerson, 1972; 
Granovetter, 1985; Macneil, 1980).  As such, by activating their strong entrepreneur-
investor tie, entrepreneurs will be more strictly regulated by the interpersonal codes 
attached to the ties in use.  Thereby, if an entrepreneur successfully draws on a strong tie 
to raise funds yet the target venture significantly underperforms or fails, he/she will tend 
to endure a greater violation of interpersonal norms.  Therefore, the focal entrepreneur is 
more likely to be personally blamed and thus suffer from higher personal loss (Ekeh, 
1974).  Reinforcing this effect is the fact that tie strength also reflects the level of 
socioemotional commitment in a tie (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter).  So by activating a 
strong tie, the entrepreneur naturally puts a larger socioemotional endowment (e.g., 
reputation, social identity, affective commitments) at risk, and thus faces higher potential 
personal loss (Jiang et al., 2012).  In sum, using strong ties to raise funds leads to higher 
personal risks for entrepreneurs.  Accordingly, they tend to be more reluctant to use 
strong social ties to raise funds for their ventures. 
H3: The strength of an entrepreneur-investor tie is negatively related to the 
likelihood that the entrepreneur will activate the tie in venture 
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fundraising. 
Interaction between tie strength and venture riskiness.  Following the same 
logic as outlined above, I further predict that the strength of entrepreneur-investor ties 
will interact with the riskiness of the venture in the tie-activation decision.  That is, 
considering the high personal risks implied by utilizing strong ties, entrepreneurs tend to 
be more sensitive to the high risks involved in venture investments with low venture 
quality or high outcome extremeness when they need to draw on strong entrepreneur-
investor ties to raise funds for their ventures.  As such, I posit that as venture quality 
declines or outcome extremeness increases, the choice to use an entrepreneur-investor tie 
changes more sharply with strong ties than with weak ties. 
H4a: The strength of an entrepreneur-investor tie moderates the relationship 
between venture quality and the likelihood of tie activation, such that as 
venture quality declines, the likelihood of tie activation decreases more 
sharply with strong ties than with weak ties.   
H4b: The strength of an entrepreneur-investor tie moderates the relationship 
between venture outcome extremeness and the likelihood of tie 
activation, such that as venture outcomes become more extreme, the 
likelihood of entrepreneur-investor tie activation decreases more sharply 
with strong ties than with weak ties.   
METHOD 
Research Setting and Data Collection 
I used the high-tech ventures in Beijing as the research setting, examining the 
venture investments between start-up stage ventures registered in Beijing and local 
	  45 
venture capital (VC) firms.  I chose this research setting for several reasons.  I chose 
start-up stage ventures because the start-up stage typically follows successful prototype 
or business model development and testing and the start-up is designed to generate the 
first production for sale (Ruhnka & Young, 1987; Sahlman, 1990; Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984).  Therefore, start-up ventures have few established business connections and 
visible achievements, thus reducing the potential confounding effects from signals of 
venture quality that are accessible to VCs (Hallen, 2008).  Likewise, choosing high-tech 
ventures registered in Beijing ensures the similarity in venture scope and geographic 
location, leading to consistency in environmental factors (industrial and business policy, 
regional economic development, infrastructure conditions, etc.). 
Second, most Chinese VC firms are located in larger cities, like Beijing and 
Shanghai (Batjargal, 2007; Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009; Lu, 
Tan, & Huang, 2011).  Also, as the center of the high-tech industrial cluster in Northern 
China, Beijing has preferential institutional and market environments, which encourage 
the participation of both entrepreneurs and investors (Chinese Yearbook, 2012).  To this 
end, the research setting provides abundant ventures and investors clustering in a 
geographically restricted region.  The spatial proximity of ventures and investors leads to 
a relatively dense entrepreneur-investor network, which naturally allows the 
establishment and maintenance of embedded social ties between entrepreneurs and VCs.  
Therefore, the research setting of local venture investment is well suited to the 
phenomenon of interest in this study. 
Our data collection included two annual surveys, one in 2011 and one in 2012.  
Both surveys were distributed after the Chinese Spring Festival (in March of 2011 and 
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February of 2012).  Because many Chinese firms close their fiscal years before the 
Chinese Spring Festival rather than before the calendar year, the timing helped us to 
capture complete information about local venture investments made during the previous 
year.  In each survey, I used the official reports and records from the Beijing 
Administration for Industry and Commerce and the Beijing Municipal Bureau of 
Financial Work to identify VC firms registered and operating in Beijing (I identified 67 
in 2010 and 70 in 2011).  With the assistance of local government and the local venture 
capital association, I approached these VCs asking for their agreement to participate in 
this study.  There were 43 firms in 2011 and 41 in 2012 that agreed to participate.  To 
check for potential nonresponse bias, I compared the participating VC firms with non-
participating ones in terms of their registered asset size and the number of investments 
they made, and found no significant differences on these dimensions.  Then, I surveyed 
the CEOs/managing partners in these VC firms about their venture investment actions 
during the previous year in the district. 
Importantly, in the venture financing process, each venture only receives 
investment from a small number of VC firms, and likewise, each VC firm can only 
evaluate and then invest in a limited number of new ventures (Hallen, 2008; Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001, 2008).  As a result, it has been widely recognized in the venture financing 
literature that relative to the population of all possible venture-VC dyads, the successful 
formation of investment ties between ventures and VCs is a rare event (Batjargal & Liu, 
2004; Hallen, 2008; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  For this reason, using all possible dyads 
between the VC firms and the start-up stage ventures to test the hypotheses would have 
yielded biased estimates, because using logistic regression to account for rare events 
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tends to underestimate coefficients for factors that predict positive outcomes (King & 
Zeng, 2001).  Moreover, intuitively, VC firms do not invest in ventures that they have not 
evaluated.  For these reasons, I restricted the sample to venture-VC dyads in which VCs 
actually evaluated the ventures as potential investment targets. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Hallen, 2008; Jensen, 2003), 
I adopted a choice-based sampling technique (Manski & Lerman, 1977; Manski & 
McFadden, 1981; McFadden, 1980).  To identify the sample new ventures, I asked the 
VC survey participants to identify all the start-up stage new ventures they had evaluated 
in the previous year in the district.  This process identified 167 ventures in the 2011 
survey and 159 ventures in the 2012 survey.  All sample ventures were private firms.  To 
ensure the representativeness of this choice-based sample, I compared these sample 
ventures and a set (500) of randomly-chosen high-tech ventures in China in terms of their 
registered asset size, number of employees, and firm age, and found no statistically 
significant differences on these dimensions.  After sending out a request to participate to 
the ventures identified above, 124 ventures in 2011 and 109 ventures in 2012 agreed to 
participate in this study.  Comparing the participating ventures with non-participating 
ones, I found no significant differences on their registered asset size, number of 
employees, or firm age.  This process led to 427 venture-VC dyads in the 2011 survey 
and 389 in the 2012 survey, which in total included 89 actual investment dyads – 
ventures funded by VC firms (42 in 2011 and 47 in 2012) – and 727 non-investment 
dyads – VCs that evaluated a sample venture but did not fund it.  These 816 effective 
dyads composed the final choice-based sample.  The 89 investment dyads involved 84 
sample ventures (i.e., three ventures received investments from two VCs and one venture 
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received investments from three VCs).  For each sample venture, I asked its major 
strategic leader (CEOs, general managers, board chairs, etc.) about new venture and 
his/her social ties with sample venture capitalists.   
All surveys were conducted via structured interviews.  The authors conducted 
face-to-face interviews with all sample VC firms and 89 sample ventures (38 in 2011 and 
56 in 2012).  Trained interviewers were hired to conduct the telephone interviews with 
the remaining sample ventures in the company of the research assistants.   
Measures 
I collected data from sample entrepreneurs and sample venture capitalists 
respectively.  Information about the venture fundraising process and the outcome was 
collected from venture capitalists and information about entrepreneur-investor ties was 
collected from entrepreneurs.  To minimize self-evaluation bias, I surveyed both venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs about venture quality and outcome extremeness.  
Additionally, I collected control variables from both sample entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists. 
To the extent possible, I used well-established measures to design the survey 
instrument.  Since most of the original measures were in English, I consulted three 
Chinese experts in entrepreneurship and venture capital research who had served as 
faculty members in US universities to ensure the accuracy of the translation.  Also, before 
the 2011 survey, I conducted eleven in-depth interviews (with four venture capitalists and 
6 entrepreneurs in the district, and one officer in the local venture capital association) to 
ensure the content validity of the measures.  Then, I conducted a pilot study including 
twelve venture capitalists and fifteen entrepreneurs to further ensure the appropriateness 
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of the survey for the research setting. 
Entrepreneur-investor ties.  As noted earlier, I surveyed sample entrepreneurs 
about their embedded social ties with sample venture capitalists.  Following prior 
network studies, especially those based on Chinese research settings (e.g., Batjargal, 2007; 
Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Chen, Chen, & Huang, 2012; Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004; Lin & 
Dumin, 1986; Yang, 1994), I used four items to measure four categories of entrepreneur-
investor ties with different strength (reported below in descending order of their tie 
strength connotation): family ties (“Among these venture capitalists, who is your family 
member or relative”), friendship ties (“…, who was your personal friend prior to your 
fundraising”), acquaintance ties (“…, who did you personally know as an acquaintance 
prior to your fundraising”), and referral ties (“…, who did you know as personally known 
by someone else you personally trust”).  Each sample entrepreneur was provided with a 
roster including the names of all sample venture capitalists that had evaluated his or her 
venture during the past year and was asked to assess his/her personal relationship with 
each venture capitalist with the above four items by choosing the one that best 
characterized the relationship.  As a result, each entrepreneur-investor dyad was coded as 
either 1 (having a tie) or 0 (not having a tie).  To measure the tie strength of each 
entrepreneur-investor tie, I coded the tie strength of family ties as 4, friendship ties as 3, 
acquaintance ties as 2, referral ties as 1, and 0 if there was no tie.  Among the 816 sample 
venture-VC dyads, 316 included social ties (of one of the above types) between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs.  Note that I also asked investors about the existence and the 
strength of all the sample entrepreneur-investor ties and their responses were fully 
consistent with those of entrepreneurs. 
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Entrepreneurs’ effort to use entrepreneur-investor ties.  As discussed above, I 
asked sample VCs to list ventures in the district that they evaluated as investment targets 
in the previous year.  To capture entrepreneurs’ efforts to use their social ties with 
venture capitalists in their fundraising, I asked the following question to venture 
capitalists in sample VCs: “Among those ventures you have evaluated, whose 
entrepreneurs have drawn on their social ties with you (including family connections, 
friendship connections, acquaintance connections, and referral connections (“somebody 
who I know well knows this entrepreneur”) to approach you and request investment 
through personal efforts (e.g., personal visiting, favor seeking, dining, etc.)?”  I dummy 
coded this measure, with the value 1 indicating the entrepreneur tried to activate a 
personal tie and 0 otherwise.  Descriptive results showed that among the 316 sample 
entrepreneur-investor dyads in which there were social ties present between the 
entrepreneur and the investor, only 180 actually involved entrepreneurs’ efforts to use 
their social ties with sample VCs (56.96%).  This provides preliminary support for the 
prediction that entrepreneurs may choose not to use their social ties with investors in their 
venture fundraising. 
Venture quality and outcome extremeness.  As discussed, I collected information 
about venture quality from both VCs and entrepreneurs.  I captured venture quality with 
two dimensions: venture growth potential and startup team qualification (Batjargal & Liu, 
2004; Shane & Cable, 2002).  Venture growth potential was measured by two items from 
Batjargal and Liu (2004).  The items were “The venture is a potentially high-growth firm” 
and “The venture’s strategy is superior to its competitors” (Cronbach’s α=.712).  Second, 
I asked entrepreneurs to evaluate the qualifications of the start-up team.  Startup team 
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qualifications were measured with the two items from Batjargal and Liu (2004).  The two 
items were “Members of the startup team had previous startup experience” and 
“Members of the startup team had experience in relevant industries” (Cronbach’s α=.848).  
All four items were captured on 5-point scales, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and 
5 indicating “strongly agree”.   
Likewise, I surveyed both VCs and entrepreneurs about the outcome extremeness 
in sample ventures.  For each sample venture, the extremeness of its venture investment 
was measured with two dimensions: the magnitude of venture investment, and the 
extremeness of venture outcome, which were captured by items based on scales from 
Forlani and Mullins (2000) and Simon, Houghton, and Aquino (2000).  The items were 
“How big was the amount of investment requested by the venture” and “How extreme 
was the expected performance (i.e., big gain and big loss) of the venture before 
fundraising?” (Cronbach’s α=.738).  The items were captured on 5-point scales, with 1 
indicating “very low” and 5 indicating “very high”.   
Importantly, it has been noted that the presence of entrepreneur-investor ties may 
tend to inflate investors’ evaluations of venture quality (Batjargal & Liu, 2004).  I 
contrasted sample VCs’ evaluation of venture quality in venture-VC dyads with and 
without entrepreneur-investor ties, clustering observations involving the same venture.  
Result showed that in general, VCs tend to have higher evaluation of the quality of 
ventures with which they have entrepreneur-investor ties (t=2.59, p<0.05).  Since having 
a tie is the natural prerequisite of using a tie (Carpenter et al., 2012), using the venture 
quality evaluation from VCs may lead to an endogeneity problem.  That is, having a tie 
may both affect using a tie, the dependent variable, and perceived venture quality, the 
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independent variable (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).  As a result, I only 
used entrepreneurs’ evaluations to capture venture quality to avoid this possible 
endogeneity problem.  Since entrepreneurs decision-making derives from their own 
perceptions, it is reasonable for us to use their judgments of venture quality.  Furthermore, 
for each sample venture, I examined the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) between 
its entrepreneur’s judgments and those of VCs.  Result showed strong agreement 
(ICC=0.72), indicating high reliability for this measure. 
For the same reason, I also examined the relationship between entrepreneur-
investor ties and VCs’ evaluations of the outcome extremeness, and found no statistically 
significant difference between venture-VC dyads with and without entrepreneur-investor 
ties (t=1.09, ns.).  Further, no evidence that I are aware of has theoretically or empirically 
shown that the presence of entrepreneur-investor ties affect VCs’ judgment about the 
magnitude of their investment outcomes or the outcome extremeness of ventures.  I 
captured venture outcome extremeness by averaging the evaluations from entrepreneurs 
and VCs, yielding a measure that reflected relatively high agreement (ICC=0.77). 
Control variables.  Following prior studies, I controlled for several attributes of 
sample VCs and ventures.  I controlled for the number of prior investments made by each 
sample VC in the technology development district, because prior studies suggest that 
experience may significantly affect VCs’ decision making patterns (e.g., Shane & Cable, 
2002; Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007).  I also controlled 
for the size of each VC firm (the assets under management).  For sample new ventures, I 
controlled for their prior fundraising experience with any VC (1 if the entrepreneur had 
prior fundraising experience from any VC and 0 otherwise).  I also controlled for the 
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number of startup team members, venture age, the age of the sample entrepreneur, and 
the scale of registered venture assets.  Since the data came from two surveys, I also 
included a year dummy to control for potential confounding effects (1 for data from 2012 
and 0 for 2011).  Finally, following prior studies, I controlled for the quality of the 
business plan that the sample ventures used in their fundraising.  Business plan quality 
was measured in the VC survey with two items from Shane and Cable (2002): “The 
business plan was thorough in its coverage of key issues” and “The business plan did an 
excellent job of articulating the opportunity” (Cronbach’s α=.879).   
Statistical method 
Consistent with prior venture financing studies (e.g., Batjargal & Liu, 2004; 
Hallen, 2008; Shane & Cable, 2002; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), I used binominal logistic 
regression to estimate the likelihood of successful venture investment in the sample of 
entrepreneur-investor dyads.  Since using logistic regression in matched data may 
potentially produce underestimates (King & Zeng, 2001), the findings are naturally on the 
conservative side.  Importantly, many ventures appeared in the sample multiple times, 
because they were evaluated by more than one VCs.  As such, the error variances for 
venture-VC dyads involving the same venture may not be independent because of some 
unobserved features of the focal venture.  For this reason, I clustered observations 
involving the same venture to avoid potential autocorrelation, which could generate 
biased coefficient variance estimates (Weesie, 1999; Wooldridge, 2002).   
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in the 
model.  In particular, the existence of entrepreneur-investor social ties and entrepreneurs’ 
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efforts to use these ties are highly but not perfectly correlated (r=.669; p<.01).  Also, the 
existence of entrepreneur-investor social ties is only marginally related to venture 
fundraising success (r=.069; p≈.10), while the likelihood of tie activation has a positive 
relationship with venture fundraising success (r=.146; p<.01).  These results provide 
preliminary evidence to support the theoretical framework, i.e., the distinction between 
“having a tie” and “using a tie”.  Since some control variables are relatively highly 
correlated, I standardized all continuous control variables to reduce multicollinearity.  
After standardization, the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) across models never 
exceeded 2.3 and the highest VIF for any variable was 3.5, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not a threat to this study (O'Brien, 2007). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Table 2 reports the logistic regressions modeling the likelihood that an 
entrepreneur will activate a personal tie with a given VC in venture fundraising.  
Obviously, actors cannot activate social ties they do not have.  As such, decision-making 
about tie activation is not relevant to entrepreneur-VC dyads without ties.  For this reason, 
I followed prior studies (e.g., Smith et al., 2012) and limited the sample to those venture-
VC dyads where personal entrepreneur-investor ties exist.  That is, I test all hypotheses 
about entrepreneur-investor tie activation (i.e., H1, H2, H3 and H4) with a subsample 
consisting of the 316 entrepreneur-VC dyads in which the entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists actually had social ties.   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Hypotheses tests 
In Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I predicted that venture quality will encourage 
entrepreneurs to use their social ties in fundraising, while outcome extremeness will 
make entrepreneurs more cautious about using their entrepreneur-investor ties.  In Model 
5 of Table 2 (the full model including all main effects), both venture quality 
(exp(b)=0.582; p<.001) and venture outcome extremeness (exp(b)=-0.738; p<.001) are 
significantly related to the utilization of entrepreneur-investor ties and in the expected 
directions.  Also, following the suggestions of Hoetker (2007) and Wiersema and Bowen 
(2009), I further examined the marginal effects of venture quality and outcome 
extremeness.  As shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the marginal effects of venture quality are 
consistently positive, and those of outcome extremeness are consistently negative.  Also, 
the magnitude of effects for both variables changes smoothly and monotonically.  Taken 
together, the evidence provides strong support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that venture quality would strengthen the effect of 
outcome extremeness.  Model 6 of Table 2 displays the evidence.  In contrast to the 
prediction, the interaction effect between venture quality and outcome extremeness is 
marginally significant and positive (exp(b)=0.635; p<.10), suggesting that venture quality 
weakens the negative effect of outcome extremeness on the utilization of entrepreneur-
investor ties and thus failing to support Hypothesis 2.  This interaction effect is graphed 
in Figure 3.1.  The figure suggests that outcome extremeness is negatively related to tie 
activation for low-quality ventures, and the effects fall to zero as venture quality 
increases.  However, for high quality ventures, outcome extremeness is uniformly 
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positively related to tie activation.  Put differently, entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
their ties to investors under two circumstances: high quality ventures with high outcome 
extremeness, and low quality ventures with low outcome extremeness.   
In Hypothesis 3, I predicted that entrepreneurs would be more cautious about 
activating their strong ties.  Model 5 of Table 2 shows, in accord with the prediction, tie 
strength is weakly negatively related to the activation of entrepreneur-investor ties 
(exp(b)=-0.321; p<.10).  Further, Figure 2.3 shows that the marginal effects of tie 
strength are persistently negative, smooth, and monotonic.  These results together provide 
weak support for Hypothesis 3. 
In Hypotheses 4a and 4b, I predicted that tie strength would intensify the effects 
of venture quality and outcome extremeness on tie activation.  Models 7 and 8 of Table 2 
display the relevant evidence.  In Model 7, the interaction effect between venture quality 
and entrepreneur-investor tie strength is significant and positive (exp(b)=0.632; p<.01), 
strongly supporting Hypothesis 4a.  Further, as shown in Figure 3.2, entrepreneurs’ 
utilization of weak ties declines as venture quality increases, while their utilization of 
strong ties increases as venture quality increases.  Put differently, for low-quality 
ventures, entrepreneurs tend to activate weak ties, while for high-quality ventures they 
tend to activate strong ties (friends and relatives).   
In contrast, Model 8 shows that the interaction between outcome extremeness and 
the strength of entrepreneur-investor ties is marginally significant but positive 
(exp(b)=0.438; p<.10), going against the prediction of Hypothesis 4b.  As shown in 
Figure 3.3, the activation of weak ties declines more sharply than the activation of strong 
ties as outcome extremeness increases.  That is, entrepreneurs are more likely to call on 
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their friends or relatives to raise funds when their ventures are characterized by outcome 
extremeness.   
To summarize, I found that entrepreneurs are more likely to use their 
entrepreneur-investor ties to raise funds under two circumstances: high quality ventures 
with high outcome extremeness, and low quality ventures with low outcome extremeness.  
Considering this finding together with the implications of entrepreneur-investor tie 
strength, I can further argue that for high quality ventures with high outcome extremeness, 
it is the strong entrepreneur-investor ties that are more likely to be activated by 
entrepreneurs seeking investors.  In contrast, for low quality ventures with low outcome 
extremeness, entrepreneurs tend to draw on weak ties.   
Further extension: Implications of the separation between having a tie and using a 
tie 
So far, I have highlighted the mechanisms underlying the choice of whether or not 
to activate a personal tie in venture fundraising.  A natural question that follows is: how 
meaningful is this differentiation in practice?  More specifically, in empirical work 
considering the value of social ties to new venture funding, does the distinction between 
having social ties with investors and activating those ties to secure funds impact the 
conclusions of empirical models?  To further demonstrate the relevance and 
meaningfulness of the differentiation between having a tie and using a tie, I also 
empirically tested the practical implications of having ties versus using ties for the 
venture fundraising success.  To capture venture fundraising success, I asked sample VCs 
about their venture investment decisions with respect to the sample ventures they 
nominated – that is, to identify which ventures they actually funded.  Venture fundraising 
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success was measured with a dummy variable.   
Notably, as I showed above, entrepreneurs’ choices about tie activation are 
affected by venture quality and outcome extremeness, both of which impacted venture 
fundraising success (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Shane & Cable, 2002).  To resolve potential 
endogeneity problems, I used instrumental-variable regression, where using a tie is the 
endogenous estimator and venture quality and outcome extremeness are the instrumental 
variables.  I applied Lewbel’s (2000) special regressor method to estimate this binary 
choice model with discrete endogenous estimator (see also Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 
2012).  Results show that after controlling for potential endogeneity, the utilization of 
entrepreneur-investor ties significantly increases the likelihood of successful funding 
(exp(b)=0.438; p<.01).  Further, I used the interaction of tie activation (a dummy variable) 
and tie strength to further evaluate the effects of tie strength.  Results show that the effect 
of tie activation on venture fundraising success is significantly strengthened by tie 
strength (exp(b)=0.759; p<.001). 
In contrast, after controlling for the activation of entrepreneur-investor ties, the 
existence of ties per se does not effectively predict venture fundraising success.  To 
control for the effects of using a tie, I excluded all entrepreneur-investor dyads in which 
entrepreneurs have social ties with investors and also used these social ties in their 
fundraising, only comparing observations in which entrepreneurs have social ties with 
investors but chose not to use them and those in which no personal tie exists.  Results 
show that in the 636 entrepreneur-investor dyads in which the entrepreneurs did not use 
social ties in their fundraising, whether the entrepreneurs had ties with VCs did not 
significantly affect their venture fundraising success, either before or after the addition of 
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venture quality indicators (as sole predictor, exp(b)=-.0.440; ns.; after entering venture 
quality indicators, exp(b)=-0.310, ns.).   
This evidence is broadly consistent with the key argument – that entrepreneurs 
will deliberately choose whether to use their social ties with investors as well as which 
ties to use.  For the inactivated or “dormant” entrepreneur-investor ties, the interpersonal 
codes embedded in these ties are intentionally separated by entrepreneurs from their 
venture fundraising efforts and, accordingly, may not affect venture fundraising success.  
Put differently, if entrepreneurs do not actively make use of their social ties with 
investors, those entrepreneur-investor ties may not be able to benefit their ventures in 
venture fundraising.  In the next section, I will discuss the implications of these results. 
DISCUSSION 
An assertion widely held by researchers is that top managers’ social ties and 
networks are valuable resources for their firms (Carpenter et al., 2012; Kilduff & Brass, 
2010; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 2010).  Motivated by this belief, scholars have so 
far devoted considerable research effort to understanding the beneficial implications of 
social ties and the mechanisms underlying those implications.  However, a few recent 
studies (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2011) have noted the absence of a subtle 
but important question: If managers have social ties with external stakeholders, does this 
necessarily mean that they will use these ties to secure resources for their firms?  Thus 
far, little effort has been paid to theoretically separating having a tie and using a tie, and 
empirically validating the distinction. 
Failing to differentiate between having a tie and using a tie may hamper the 
understanding of social ties and networks in organizational and management contexts.  
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For example, not differentiating between these two concepts can blur the actual 
implications of managers’ social ties for firm-level operations and performance.  As I and 
others have noted, some conclusions in prior social network and social capital studies 
have reported a distinct lack of significance for managers’ social ties as an antecedent of 
firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2012).  One possible explanation, investigated in this 
study, is that managers may intentionally avoid using their social ties to serve their firms.  
It is reasonable to expect that only those managerial ties are actually accessed by 
managers can contribute to performance.  Drawing on this insight, it is necessary to 
specifically differentiate between activated managerial ties and “inactivated” or “dormant” 
ties, rather than simply assuming all managerial personal ties and networks as firms’ 
social capital. 
In this paper, I attempted to specifically address the differentiation between 
having a tie and using a tie for managers.  Drawing on the rationale of social 
embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997, 1999), I argued that the reason that managers sometimes 
avoid using their social ties to secure resources for their firms is because tie activation 
involves the acceptance of personal risk.  That is, by drawing on the interpersonal codes 
embedded in their social ties to convince or obligate investors to invest, managers may be 
perceived as personally responsible for any undesired outcomes.  Accordingly, the 
managers may jeopardize the social ties they activate, potentially losing valuable social 
capital and socioemotional wealth (Coleman, 1990; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; 
Granovetter, 1985; Jiang et al., 2012).  Therefore, using their social ties to seek resources 
for their firms is a risky decision for managers and one they will carefully weigh.   
I used a specific setting, i.e., entrepreneurs using their social ties with investors in 
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venture fundraising, to specifically illustrate the decision making underlying managerial 
tie activation.  As discussed earlier, entrepreneurs have relatively high motivation to 
apply their social ties for the benefit of their ventures (Li & Zhang, 2007) and, if tie 
activation is successful, investors accept significant financial risk.  Accordingly, the 
entrepreneurship setting is a good one for testing the theoretical framework.  I examined 
the implications of two major sources of entrepreneurs’ personal risks, i.e., the riskiness 
of venture investment, which depicts the scale of risk they personally obligate investors 
to share, and the strength of the entrepreneur-investor tie in use, which captures the 
severity of the possible norm violation as well as the magnitude of consequent 
socioemotional losses.  Following prior studies, the riskiness of requested venture 
investment can be captured by two proxies: venture quality and outcome extremeness.  
Drawing on behavioral decision making theory (e.g., Hogarth, 1989; Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), I predicted 
the way in which these risk determinants (venture quality, outcome extremeness, and the 
strength of the tie in use) respectively and jointly affect entrepreneurs’ choice to use their 
social ties to raise funds for their ventures.   
Our empirical results supported most of the hypotheses.  Specifically, I found that 
tie activation was strengthened by high venture quality and weakened by high outcome 
extremeness – both findings confirming that venture risk affects the tie activation 
decision.  Also, given the potential for high socioemotional losses implied by using 
strong ties, entrepreneurs are generally more conservative about using their strong ties in 
venture fundraising.  Finally, as I predicted, the interaction between tie strength and 
venture quality showed that as venture quality declines, the choice to use activate a tie 
	  62 
decreases more sharply with strong ties than with weak ties.  Taken together, these 
findings confirm that entrepreneurs are generally averse to the personal risks incurred by 
using their entrepreneur-investor ties to raise funds and thus will deliberately choose 
whether or not to activate a tie as well as which tie to activate.   
A surprising and intriguing finding that was contrary to the prediction is that for 
high (low) quality ventures, high (low) outcome extremeness tends to significantly 
encourage tie activation.  Put differently, entrepreneurs are more likely to use their 
entrepreneur-investor ties in their venture fundraising under two circumstances: high 
quality ventures with high outcome extremeness, and low quality ventures with low 
outcome extremeness (see Figure 2.1).  Further, as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, 
entrepreneurs are more likely to draw on their strong ties when venture quality is high 
and when venture outcomes are extreme.  I can therefore further argue that for high-
quality ventures with high outcome extremeness, strong entrepreneur-investor ties are 
more likely to be activated.  In contrast, for low-quality ventures with low outcome 
extremeness, entrepreneurs tend to draw on weak ties with investors.   
I attribute this pattern of entrepreneurs’ personal tie activation to the framing of 
the decision to activate.  It is likely high venture quality leads entrepreneurs tend to focus 
more on the possible big win, perceiving extreme-outcome ventures as big opportunities.  
As such, the norms involved in their social ties may obligate entrepreneurs to share such 
opportunities with their strong ties.  For example, an experienced entrepreneur said: 
“…sometimes I actually feel obliged to include my close friends or relatives in my 
entrepreneurial efforts by letting them invest in my ventures.  [This is] [b]ecause I am 
confident that the venture could make a big hit and make everyone on board rich in the 
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foreseeable future.  If that happened, where would I be if I hadn’t invited my relatives or 
friends [to invest]?  For sure they will be angry at me for not presenting a great 
opportunity to them.  They may even feel betrayed by me.  That’s why I may as well just 
turn to them first to get big money for the ventures I feel very confident of, even if that 
means they could end up losing what they invest…” 
Finally, as an extension to the major findings, I also tested the implications of the 
separation between having a tie and using a tie for venture fundraising performance.  
Results show that as expected, after controlling for the effects of entrepreneurs’ choice to 
activate a tie, the existence of social ties between entrepreneurs and investors had no 
statistically significant effect on venture fundraising success.  Specifically, if an 
entrepreneur decides to not use his/her social ties with a VC, this VC, despite the 
presence of a tie, will not favor the venture in financing decisions.   
It has been noted that social ties and networks can serve both as pipes through 
which actors can exchange otherwise inaccessible information and as carriers of social 
norms and interpersonal rules that regulate actors’ interactions (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Carpenter et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2012; Podolny, 2001).  For non-activated ties where 
the normative implications are insulated from the venture investment relationships, the 
ties may still be valuable as information channels, providing investors with access to 
private information about entrepreneurs and their ventures in trustworthy ways.  In 
settings like this, the effects of entrepreneur-investor ties serve to help investors 
accurately assess venture value and promise, without concern for entrepreneurs’ potential 
opportunism (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Broschak, 2004).  As such, the empirical 
findings of prior studies conform to the evidence I presented about non-activated 
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entrepreneur-investor ties.  That is, they intrinsically work as a risk-mitigating instrument, 
the effects of which depend on the riskiness of the requested venture investments rather 
than a cronyism mechanism that directly advances the success of venture fundraising.  
This interesting result aligns with the argument made by Smith and colleagues (2011), 
such that actors’ intentional activation of social ties is necessary for the ties to have an 
impact, therefore further confirming that it is both necessary and meaningful for future 
social capital researchers to specifically differentiate “having a tie” and “using a tie”. 
Moreover, the practical implication of the differentiation between having a tie and 
using a tie also suggests a methodological issue in managerial tie and network research, 
most troublesome when responding actors accept significant risk by responding to a 
personal request from another.  That is, it may be inappropriate to simply examine the 
effects of the presence of managerial ties and networks on firm outcomes.  That is, 
simply examining the existence of managerial social ties without differentiating between 
activated and non-activated ties effectively omits a meaningful variable that both directly 
relates to the major predictor (i.e., having a tie) and affects the predicted outcome (i.e., 
firm performance).  This would result in an omitted variables problem and accordingly, 
might hide the true implications of managerial ties and networks (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton 
& Nickerson, 2003).  To fully understand the performance implications of managerial ties 
and networks, it is necessary to specifically differentiate having a tie from using a tie to 
deal with the potential endogeneity problem.   
Expected contributions 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First and foremost, I 
contribute to social network research by shedding light on an understudied topic – the 
	  65 
difference between the network an actor participates in, and his/her efforts to apply this 
network toward instrumental ends (Carpenter et al., 2012).  Specifically, by theoretically 
separating “having a tie” from “using a tie”, and empirically showing the importance of 
this distinction, I contribute to the extant network research by showing the need for 
theoretically and empirically separating the potential network an actor participates in and 
the activated network the actor actually applies.  This distinction is important any time tie 
activation places the responding network member at some risk.  This study demonstrates 
that to understand the benefits actors actually secure from their social ties, it is necessary 
for researchers to specifically capture social tie activation, rather than simply assuming 
that actors will always use their social ties as needed.  As such, this study provides a new 
perspective for understanding the actual implications of social ties and networks. 
Second, this study also contributes to the strategic leadership literature by 
providing an explanation for the mixed evidence about the effect size of managerial ties 
and networks, showing that not all managerial social contacts actually contribute to firms.  
Instead, to better understand the actual effects and implications of social ties and 
networks in managerial contexts, it is necessary for future researchers to consider the 
actual process through which value is captured from managerial social ties.  Particularly, 
it is valuable to specifically highlight the managerial decision-making and effort behind 
social tie activation, rather than generally aggregate all managerial social ties as part of 
the social capital endowments of firms. 
This study also contributes to the extant venture financing literature.  First, I 
addressed the discrepancy between the findings of prior venture financing studies and the 
social embeddedness perspective, showing that whether social ties between entrepreneurs 
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and investors can effectively facilitate venture fundraising success after controlling for 
the effects of venture quality largely depends on whether the social ties are actually used 
by entrepreneurs.  Moreover, by using behavioral decision theory to highlight actors’ 
decision making process in venture investment, this study provides a new theoretical 
perspective for studying venture investment that goes beyond and complements prevalent 
theoretical approaches in prior venture finance research, such as transaction cost analysis 
(e.g., Sahlman, 1990) and agency theory (e.g., Gompers, 1996).   
Future Extensions  
As an initial research effort examining the difference between “having a tie” and 
“using a tie”, this study has several potential limitations that also suggest directions for 
future research.  First, in this study, all theoretical relationships were developed and 
tested in the specific context of new ventures and venture fundraising.  Also, I only 
focused on social ties between investors and entrepreneurs.  As such, caution is needed in 
generalizing the results of this study to other settings.  Future research can benefit from 
replicating the present study in the context of established firms and comparing the 
conclusions across different contexts and different managerial social ties.  Additionally, I 
note that this study does not generalize to settings where responding actors confront low 
costs and low risks, and such settings are quite common. 
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FIGURE 2  
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
2.1 Venture quality (on tie utilization)      2.2 Outcome extremeness (on tie utilization) 
 
 
2.3 Strength of entrepreneur-investor ties (on tie utilization) 
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FIGURE 3 
INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEN RISK COMPONENTS AND TIE 
STRENGTH  
Figure 3.1 
 
Figure 3.2 
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Figure 3.3 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRONG ENOUGH TO FIGHT OR STRONG ENOUGH TO FLEE? EXECUTIVE 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SHIP JUMPING IN DECLINING FIRMS 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been widely acknowledge in strategic leadership research that top 
executives’ social capital can significantly benefits their firms, providing access to 
otherwise inaccessible resources (Li & Zhang, 2007; Shane & Cable, 2002; Hallen, 2008; 
Uzzi & Ryon, 2003), reducing transaction costs in interorganizational relationships 
(Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997), and so on.  Following this logic, scholars have consensually 
deemed executives’ social capital a valuable endowment of their firms (i.e., “managerial 
social capital”, c.f., Acquaah, 2007), devoting considerable effort to highlighting the 
benefits of executives’ social capital and social capital and the underlying mechanisms 
(Carpenter, Li, & Jiang, 2012).   
However, I argue that this consensus might be incomplete.  It has been recently 
noted that actors intentionally determine the way in which they utilize their social capital 
(Jiang, Cannella, Jiao, & Gao, 2014; Levin, Walter, & Murnighan, 2011; Smith, Menon, 
& Thompson, 2012).  Drawing on this insight, the beneficial implications of top 
executives’ social capital for their firms may largely arise from their role as strategic 
leaders, which naturally motivates them to use their personal endowments to serve the 
best interest of their firms (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  However, it is 
natural that these executives also have self-interested considerations (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2003).  In this regard, it is likely that executives may decide to utilize their 
social capital for their own benefits, rather than in ways that can serve the best interests 
of their firms.  Accordingly, executives’ social capital may not necessarily benefit the 
firms but rather personally benefit the executives.   
This debate has particularly important implications when there is potential 
	  74 
conflict of interests between executives and their firms.  Particularly, in declining firms 
endangered by crisis (e.g., severe financial loss, scandal, etc.), executives’ social capital 
may have two-fold implications.  On the one hand, managerial social capital provides the 
firms valuable resources and social support to manage and survive the decline (e.g., Daily, 
1995; Fischer & Pollock, 2004, Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001).  On the other 
hand, executives’ social capital, as an important source of information and social impact 
(Burt, 2001; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), may provide executives more 
opportunities to “jump ship”, i.e., proactive and voluntary departure from the declining 
firms (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Semadeni, Cannella, 
Fraser, & Lee, 2008).   
Accordingly, executives in declining firms may choose to use their social capital 
in two contrasting ways.  On the one hand, executives, as the strategic leaders of their 
firms, may use their social capital to serve the best interests of their firms and turn around 
the decline.  However, doing so may cause the executives’ personal losses such as tainted 
reputations and devaluation on the labor market (Semadeni et al., 2008).  On the other 
hand, executives may use their social capital to serve their best self-interest, searching for 
ship-jumping opportunities and abandoning the endangered firms.  As such, in a 
declining firm, an executive’s social capital tends to have paradoxical implications, either 
inhibiting or encouraging his/her ship-jumping behavior.  This dilemma leads to the 
following unanswered question: How does executives’ social capital affect their ship-
jumping behaviors in declining firms? 
I draw upon the perspective of resource dependence theory (RDT) to address this 
question.  Focusing on the interdependent relationships between actors, RDT posits that 
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the dependence of an actor on other actors allows others to exert some level of power 
over the focal actor and thus affect its decisions and actions (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  In their seminal study, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) posit that these 
interdependencies existing within and beyond an organization, and, consequently, the 
distribution of power and control in the organization, both affect “the tenure and selection 
of major organizational administrators” (1978: 228).  As such, RDT provides a natural 
theoretical perspective to examine executives’ ship-jumping behavior (Hillman, Withers 
& Collins, 2009).  Following the logic of RDT, I attribute executives’ ship-jumping 
behavior to two forms of dependencies, i.e., their external dependencies on the 
environmental context, and their internal dependencies on their firms. 
Prior studies suggest that a central incentive for executives to jump ship is to keep 
themselves from being personally stigmatized by their firms’ crisis (Semadeni et al., 
2008).  As such, I posit that executives may depend on taking external positions to avoid 
the potential stigma.  In this regard, the social capital endowments of executives 
determine the degree of their external dependencies on these external positions.  That is, 
as important components of executives’ social capital, these social contacts and networks 
can serve as a buffering mechanism that effectively mitigates the negative personal 
impact of firm crisis on executives (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, Hambrick, 2008; Zajonc, 
1980).  Accordingly, executives with high social capital endowments depend less on 
taking new jobs to avoid stigmatization by the current firm.  However, executives’ social 
capital also determines the feasibility of their external employment opportunities (Dess & 
Shaw, 2001; Smith et al., 2012).  As such, while a low network endowment makes it 
more necessary for an executive to jump ship, it also confines his/her available 
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opportunities to do so.  Taken together, I posit a non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) 
relationship between executives’ social capital endowment and their ship-jumping 
behavior. 
Executives also depend on the resource endowments of their firms and the 
members in their firms (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Hillman et al., 2009).  Particularly, 
executives largely depend on their firms, as well as their network endowments, to 
develop their social ties and networks (Westphal, Boivie, Chng, 2006; Zajac, 1988).  
These internal dependencies also tend to affect executives’ decision to jump ship. 
Following this logic, I adopt two indicators for these internal dependencies, i.e., the peer 
social capital, which refers to the social capital endowments of other upper-echelon 
administrators in a firm, and the interfirm network, which refers to the firm’s interfirm 
relationships in the broader industrial network.  I posit that both peer and interfirm 
network can reduce the likelihood of executive ship jumping behavior, as well as 
strengthen the effect of executives’ social capital on their ship-jumping behavior. 
I strive for the following contributions.  First, as discussed, prior network studies 
have largely taken executives’ social capital as a resource of their firms.  I point out that 
this argument is not complete.  Using the instance of executives’ ship-jumping behavior 
in declining firms, I highlight that executives may not always use their social capital to 
benefit the firm; instead, they may use these networks in self-interesting ways to serve 
their personal interest.  As such, I contribute to social capital research by providing a 
more complete understanding about the implications of executive social capital and 
highlighting the boundary conditions of its benefits, i.e., the “managerial social capital” 
(Acquaah, 2007, Peng & Luo, 2000).   
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Second, I contribute to strategic leadership research by exploring a new way of 
applying resource dependence theory in this area.  Resource dependence theory has been 
widely applied in studying the relationship between firms and their upper echelon 
administrators (Hillman et al., 2009).  However, with few exceptions, prior studies 
unilaterally focus on how firms depend on the endowments of their executives and 
directors (e.g., human capital, social capital, reputation, status, etc.) (e.g., Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Daily, 1996; Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003), yet paid little attention to understanding the counterpart of the interdependence, 
i.e., how executives and directors depend on their firms.  By using RDT to highlight how 
firms’ social capital endowments impact executives’ ship-jumping behavior, I explore the 
implications of executives’ dependence on their firms, thus complementing the extant 
strategic leadership and resource dependence studies. 
Lastly, I show that the effects of executives’ social capital for their ship-jumping 
behavior may vary across different levels of social capital endowments of a firm.  This 
finding indicates that executives may intentionally decide the way in which they use their 
networks based on different contingencies.  In this regard, echoing the call of recent 
comprehensive reviews (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2012), this study points out an important 
direction for future managerial decision research, i.e., the decision to utilize their social 
capital.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Jump ship from declining firms  
When a firm faces severe decline, its executives may opt for abandoning the 
endangered firm and taking new jobs somewhere else.  This action is labeled as “jump 
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ship”, i.e., proactive and voluntary turnover in firms under crisis (large financial loss, 
bankruptcy, scandal, etc.) (Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Semadeni et al., 2008).  Given its 
popularity and prominence in modern firms, ship-jumping behavior of upper-echelon 
administrators has recently attracted increasing research effort.   
A central incentive behind executives’ ship-jumping behavior is to avoid personal 
stigmatization by the crisis of the firms they serve.  Stigma refers to the damage and stain 
to actors’ identity deriving from socially discredited events, characteristics, or 
associations (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009; Goffman, 1963).  Prior research 
has illustrated how this stigma may transfer from firms to their members, especially 
executives (D'Aveni, 1990; Kulik, Bainbridge, & Cregan, 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; 
Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  Specifically, as the major agents of their firms, executives are 
often perceived as personally associated with and responsible for their firms’ actions and 
outcomes (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987).  As such, 
when discrediting events stigmatize a firm (corporate failure, organizational misconduct, 
etc.), this association between the firm and its executives is likely to mar the reputation 
and social identity of the executives (Pozner, 2008).  From this perspective, if an 
executive chose to stay in the declining firm, he/she may be perceived by external 
stakeholders as personally responsible for the decline and possible failure of the firm, 
thus leading to potential personal losses such as damaged professional reputation and 
devaluation by the labor market (Boivie et al., 2012).  To avoid the potential “stigma-by-
association” (Goffman, 1963) with their declining firms, executives tend to be 
encouraged to jump ship before the firms actually fail and use the proactive exit to 
buttress the potential personal stigma (Semadeni et al., 2008). 
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Importantly, ship-jumping behaviors may cause significant costs, such as the pay 
cut of taking a lower-level job and the loss of firm-specific skills and knowledge and 
social status (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Boivie et al., 2012).  These potential costs may 
discourage executives from jumping ship.  Moreover, external opportunities for 
executives to jump ship from their current firms may not be always available. Therefore, 
it is reasonable that executives may need to deliberately balance the potential benefits and 
costs of ship jumping and make the decision of doing so or not.   
Nevertheless, so far, little effort has been devoted to examining how executives in 
declining firms make the decision to jump ship.  Few recent studies have discussed the 
determination of directors’ ship-jumping behavior.  For example, Marcel and Cowen 
(2013) focused on the ship-jumping behavior of directors following fraud announcements, 
pointing out that directors with higher relational and human capital are more likely to stay 
and strive to turn around the crisis (“cleaning house”) rather than jumping ship.  Boivie, 
Graffin and Pollock (2012) showed that the financial and reputational risk related to 
shareholder lawsuits and financial restatements can motivate directors to jump ship.  
However, as insiders who are deeply embedded in their firms, executives may have 
different considerations than directors in the decision of ship jumping.  For example, 
directors can simultaneously serve on multiple boards, while executive positions are 
generally full time and exclusive.  Therefore, the ship-jumping behavior of executives 
may be more confined.   
Taken together, the decision mechanism behind executives’ ship-jumping 
behavior remains unclear.  Against this backdrop, I strive to highlight the way in which 
executives in declining firms decide whether or not to jump ship.   
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A resource dependence model of executive ship jumping 
I draw upon the perspective of resource dependence theory to address the paradox 
between the potential benefits and costs of ship jumping.  Resource dependence theory 
(RDT) posits that actors are embedded in networks of interdependencies where they rely 
upon each other to survive and perform (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  This 
resource dependence perspective has been widely applied to depict the relationship 
between firms and their upper-echelon administrators (Daily et al., 2001; Hillman et al., 
2009).  On the one hand, firms depend on the resources and capabilities of their 
executives and directors to support their operations and achieve superior performance.  
On the other hand, executives and directors depend on their firms to secure economic 
rents and develop their personal identity, reputation and social capital (Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, & Fredickson, 1993; Westphal et al., 2006; Zajac, 1988).  In such a manner, 
it is reasonable to predict that executives’ dependencies on their firms will impact their 
decision making, including their ship-jumping behaviors. 
Particularly, I posit that the benefits and costs of ship-jumping behaviors both 
arise from executives’ interdependencies inside and outside of their firms.  First, as 
discussed, the central benefit of ship-jumping behavior is for executives to avoid being 
personally stigmatized by their firms (Semadeni et al., 2008).  For the purpose, 
executives rely upon external employment opportunities to defend their personal identity 
and social status.  Put differently, the benefits of ship jumping are determined by the 
extent to which executives depend on accepting external positions to prevent potential 
stigmatization by their current firms.  Meanwhile, the potential costs of jumping ship, 
which mainly arise from the opportunity costs of giving up the position in the current 
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firms, are largely determined by executives’ dependence on their current firms.  
Following this logic, I suggest that executives’ ship-jumping behaviors are largely 
determined by both their internal and external dependencies. 
Drawing on this resource dependence perspective, in this study I focus on using 
an important personal endowment of executives, i.e., their social networks, to highlight 
the decision mechanism of their ship-jumping behavior.  Prior studies show that 
executives’ social capital is one of the essential antecedents of their turnover (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002; Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Finkelstein et al., 2009).  Meanwhile, as 
an essential managerial personal resource as well as an important connection between 
executives and their firms, executives’ social capital endowments also affect the extent to 
which they are stigmatized by their firms (Jiang, Cannella, & Jiao, 2013; Wiesenfeld et 
al., 2008).  In such a manner, it is reasonable to posit that executives’ social capital tends 
to play essential roles in the decision of their ship jumping.  I draw on the above resource 
dependence perspective to develop hypotheses below about how executives’ social 
capital endowments affect their ship-jumping behavior, as well as the contingencies 
under which their effects may vary. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
It has been widely acknowledged that executives’ social capital endowments can 
significantly benefit both the executives themselves and their firms (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Carpenter et al., 2012).  For this reason, I suggest that the social capital of executives may 
have two-fold implication for their ship-jumping behaviors.  On the one hand, it has been 
widely acknowledged that social capital can provide actors better access to external 
employment opportunities (e.g., Burt, 1992; Dess & Shaw, 2001; Seibert, Kraimer, & 
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Liden, 2001).  As such, it is reasonable that executives with higher social capital 
endowments are more likely to find new jobs quickly without suffering significant social 
and financial loss, allowing them to more effectively jump ship.  On the other hand, 
executives’ social capital endowments are of particularly high value for the turnaround of 
declining firms (Daily, 1995), and declining firms will favor the retention of executives 
with high social capital endowments (Marcel & Cowen, 2014), and thus strive to better 
attract and keep these executives so as to retain their social capital.  This potentially 
increases the opportunity costs for those socially well-endowed executives to jump ship.  
As such, executives’ social capital tends to simultaneously enhance the potential benefits 
and costs of jumping ship.  This paradox blurs the implications of executives’ social 
capital for the ship-jumping behavior.   
The resource dependence framework of ship jumping provides a valuable 
perspective to address the seemingly paradoxical implications of executives’ social 
capital.  As discussed, executives’ ship-jumping behavior largely reflects the balance 
between their dependencies on external employment opportunities to avoid stigmatization 
and their dependencies on their firms.  Following this logic, the above two-fold 
implications of executives’ social capital tend to affect both their external and internal 
dependencies.  Plus, these interdependencies between the executives and their firms also 
tend to be impacted by the endowments and resources of the firms (Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993), which will accordingly moderate the effects of the social capital endowments of 
the executives. 
Executives’ social capital and ship jumping: A resource dependence model 
As discussed, the nature of executives’ ship-jumping behavior in declining firms 
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rests in the truth that executives need to proactively leave their current firms so as to cut 
the personal association through which the potential failure of the firms may stigmatize 
them personally (Semadeni et al., 2008).  In such a manner, the more likely executives 
will be personally blamed for and stigmatized by the firm failure, the more they will 
depend on taking external employment opportunities as a buffering mechanism to defend 
their reputation and social status from the stigma-by-association with their firms (Devers 
et al., 2009). 
Social capital of executives may also work as a mitigating mechanism for the 
potential stigmatization (Jiang et al., 2014; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  First, executives 
with abundant social contacts can use their social contacts as channels to effectively 
communicate private information about themselves and about their firms (Davis & Greve, 
1997; Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; Shane & Cable, 2002).  This private information can 
help executives to divert the blame or defend themselves when encountering firm decline 
or crisis, thus separating themselves from discredit by association with their firms 
(Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  Second, executives who have high levels of social capital 
endowments are generally perceived as reliable, credible and competent (D’Aveni, 1990; 
Giordano, 1983).  These positive stereotypes may change the way in which external 
stakeholders interpret and attribute the failure or crisis of the firms.  That is, in their 
sensemaking process, external stakeholders are less likely to blame executives with high 
social capital endowments for the discrediting events of their firms in order to keep the 
consistency of their perception toward the executives; instead, they tend to justify and 
excuse these executives (Hollander, 1958; Sonenshein, 2007; Weick, 1995).  Moreover, 
through the social embeddedeness perspective (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997, 1999), the 
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interpersonal codes of mutual support and trustworthiness attached in social ties and 
networks tend to drive the executives’ social contacts to support them and tolerate their 
mistakes (Jiang et al., 2014).  For this reason, social capital endowments tend to protect 
executives from being stigmatized by the decline of their firms, thus lowering their 
dependence on external opportunities and making it less necessary for them to jump ship 
to avoid stigmatization.  Plus, as discussed above, executives with high social capital 
endowments tend to be particularly valuable for declining firms to turnaround (Daily, 
1995).  Therefore, declining firms may strive to retain these well-endowed executives 
with extra efforts, such as higher compensation and more titles, thus increasing their 
dependence on the current firms and increasing the potential opportunity costs of their 
ship jumping.  Taken together, I posit that executives with high levels of social capital 
endowments tend to be less likely to jump ship. 
In contrast, executives with low levels of social capital do not have enough social 
capital to draw on to effectively buffer themselves from the decline or crisis of their firms.  
Accordingly, they tend to rely more on jumping ship to avoid the stigmatization.  
However, as discussed, executives’ social capital endowments also affect the availability 
of external employment opportunities (Burt, 1992; Smith et al., 2012).  While it is more 
necessary for executives with few social contacts to jump ship, their social capital may 
not be able to provide appropriate opportunities, thus hampering them from doing so.  As 
a result, executives with low levels of social capital endowments may be confined in their 
current firms and less likely to jump ship.   
Taken together, I expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between executives’ 
social capital endowments and their ship-jumping behavior in declining firms.  That is, 
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when the social capital endowment of executives is low, it may impede the executives’ 
search for external employment opportunities and thus hamper their ship-jumping 
behavior.  As their network endowment increases, it will lead to more and more ship-
jumping opportunities and thus allow the executives to do so.  However, when executives’ 
social capital endowment becomes very high, it will decrease the necessity for the 
executives to jump ship to avoid stigmatization and increase the opportunity costs of 
doing so, thus discouraging their ship-jumping behavior.  I thus have the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between executives’ social 
capital endowment and their ship-jumping behavior, such that executives with 
medium high levels of social capital are more likely to jump ship. 
Peer social capital and interfirm networks 
It has been widely acknowledged that executives’ decisions and actions, including 
their turnover, are affected by the resources held by their firms and other members in the 
firms (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton & Dalton, 2006; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009).  Through the resource dependence perspective, in the 
interdependency between executives and their firms, the resource endowments of the 
firms and the members of the firms determine an executive’s dependence on them, thus 
shaping his/her relative power and decision-making discretion in the firm (Hillman et al., 
2009).  Following this logic, in this study I focus on a central resource of executives’ peer 
upper-echelon administrators and the firms, i.e., their social capital, exploring their roles 
in determining executives’ ship-jumping behavior. 
Peer social capital.  I define an executive’s peer social capital as the network 
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endowments of other upper-echelon administrators (i.e., executives and directors) in 
his/her firm.  First, executives can establish personal connections with other executives 
and directors in their firms through their daily communication and interaction, thus 
making these peer upper-echelon administrators important components of their social 
networks (Jiang et al., 2014).  As such, the more prestigious and socially well-endowed 
these peer administrators, the more would they contribute to the focal executives’ social 
status and reputation and thus help the executives to better develop their personal 
influence and social capital.  Moreover, through the brokerage of their peer 
administrators, executives can be referred to otherwise unconnected external stakeholders 
(Burt, 1992).  For example, Kim and Cannella (2008) suggest that connections with other 
directors can help upper-echelon administrators to receive more external director 
appointments.  This referral effect of peer social capital can facilitate the development of 
the executives’ social network.  Accordingly, by providing access to a wider range of 
external contacts, peer administrators with higher social capital endowments can better 
help the executives in developing their social capital.   
Taken together, I posit that executives depend on the peer social capital 
endowments of other executives and directors in their firms.  This internal dependence 
has important implications for the ship-jumping behaviors of the executives.  On the one 
hand, jumping ship may potentially break the connections between executives and their 
peer administrators (Carpenter et al., 2012).  As such, when other upper-echelons in their 
firms have abundant social capital, it will be harder for the executives to find a new job 
that can effectively compensate the loss of their current peer social capital endowments, 
therefore significantly increasing the opportunity cost for executives to jump ship.  On 
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the other hand, as a source of executives’ dependence on their firms, the social capital 
endowments of upper-echelon administrators determine their power (Stevenson & Radin, 
2009; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  Therefore, high peer social capital depicts high power 
of other administrators over the executives, which, to resource dependence theory, allows 
them to exert high levels of influence over the executives’ actions and decisions (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978).  This may also potentially hamper the executives from voluntarily 
abandoning their declining firms and proactively jump ship.  Taken together, I have the 
following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2: The peer social capital of other upper-echelon administrators in a firm is 
negatively related to the likelihood of executives’ ship-jumping behavior. 
Interfirm network.  I define a firm’s interfirm network as its interorganizational 
exchange relationships with other firms in the industrial network.  The interfirm network 
of a firm is an important resource for its executives.  On the one hand, as discussed, the 
reputation and social status of executives are tightly associated with the status of their 
firms (Devers et al., 2009; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  As such, serving in the central firms 
with high status in the industrial network can largely benefit the reputation and social 
status of executives.  On the other hand, it has been noted that executives often develop 
their own personal relationships based on the interfirm contacts of their firms (e.g., 
Westphal et al., 2006; Zajac, 1988).  In such a manner, executives can benefit from their 
firms’ interfirm networks in the development of their social capital (Carpenter et al., 
2012).   
Drawing on this insight, I argue that the size of a firm’s interfirm network also 
determines its executives’ dependence on the firm.  Accordingly, executives’ 
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on their firms’ interfirm networks tend to impact their ship-jumping behavior.  First, as 
discussed above, it increases the opportunity costs of ship jumping, such that it is harder 
for executives to get new employment opportunities that can effectively substitute the 
current employers with abundant interfirm relationships and central status in the 
industrial network.  Plus, the size of a firm’s interfirm network and (accordingly) its 
industrial status largely determine the autonomy of their executives (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987; Granovetter, 1985), such that in firms that are deeply embedded in 
large amount of interfirm relationships, the decisions and actions of executives may be 
largely impacted and sanctioned by external stakeholders (Carpenter et al, 2012; Uzzi, 
1997, 1999).  In such a manner, executives’ ship-jumping behavior may be further 
discouraged by the social or institutional pressures from the industrial network.  Taken 
together, I posit: 
Hypothesis 3: The size of the interfirm network of a firm is negatively related to the 
likelihood of executives’ ship-jumping behavior. 
Moderating effects of peer social capital and interfirm network.  Given the 
above implications of peer social capital and interfirm network, I further expect them to 
moderate the non-monotonic effect of executives’ social capital on their ship-jumping 
behavior.  Specifically, in firms with higher levels of peer social capital and interfirm 
network endowments, executives with low social capital endowments will be more 
constrained in their ship jumping.  That is, their limited social contacts will hamper them 
to find external employment opportunities that can effectively compensate the high social 
loss of leaving the current firms (Burt, 1992).  Likewise, for executives with high social 
capital endowments, the higher opportunity costs of ship jumping, coupled with their low 
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necessity of doing so, will further reduce their willingness to proactively jump ship.  
Taken together, peer social capital and interfirm networks tend to effectively reduce the 
likelihood for executives with low or high social capital to jump ship.   
However, for executives with medium levels of social capital, high peer social 
capital and interfirm network endowments may have more complicated implications.  
That is, when the network endowments of their peers and the firms increase, executives 
will suffer from stronger power disadvantage (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Stevenson & 
Radin, 2009), thus making them more likely to become the victim of the scapegoating 
process, where the firms and other executives and directors attribute the discredited 
events to the focal executives (Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Shen & Cho, 2005).  In such a 
manner, in firms with higher levels of peer social capital and interfirm network 
endowments, executives with medium levels of social capital endowments suffer from 
higher risk of being scapegoated, because they may not be able to defend themselves as 
the most well-connected ones can.  However, comparing with highly socially constrained 
executives, they can still get access to ship-jumping opportunities, even if the opportunity 
costs of doing so are also increased.  In such a manner, I expect the likelihood of ship 
jumping for executives with medium levels of social capital may decline slower when 
their firms’ peer social capital and interfirm network endowments increase. 
Hypothesis 4a: The peer social capital of other upper echelon administrators in a firm 
will positively moderate the effect of executives’ social capital on their ship-
jumping behavior.  That is, when peer social capital becomes higher, the 
likelihood of ship jumping among executive with low or high social capital 
endowments will decline more significantly. 
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Hypothesis 4b: The size of the interfirm network of a firm will positively moderate the 
effect of executives’ social capital on their ship-jumping behavior.  That is, 
when the size of interfirm network becomes larger, the likelihood of ship 
jumping among executives with low or high social capital endowments will 
decline more significantly. 
METHOD 
Sample 
The specially treated public firms in Chinese stock market provide an excellent 
natural setting to test my hypotheses.  In May 2003, China launched the revised delisting 
risk monitoring system, mandating that if a publicly listed company reports accounting 
losses in two consecutive years, its stock will be put under special treatment (ST for short) 
for delisting risk warning and listed with the prefix of “*ST” (Jiang & Wang, 2008).  *ST 
stocks are subject to special trading and financial restrictions.  For example, the daily 
stock price movement for an ST stock cannot exceed 5% in either direction.  Moreover, 
the ST stock will not be allowed to raise additional capital from the stock market.  After a 
stock is prefixed with *ST, it will be suspended from public trading after the company 
reports one more annual loss, and delisted after two.  In contrast, the company will be 
able to remove the *ST prefix if its performance is significantly improved after the *ST 
filing.  Drawing on this insight, in Chinese stock market, the *ST filing indicates both the 
current decline of a company’s performance and the high risk of its stock market failure 
in the future.  As such, a company’s *ST announcement is a strong and publicly 
accessible signal indicating its declining tendency (Zhou, 2013).  Moreover, since the 
*ST filing requires two consecutive annual financial losses, it naturally allows executives 
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to proactively jump ship before the filing.   
I collected longitudinal data about 248 publicly listed Chinese companies whose 
stock was prefixed with *ST (*ST companies for short) from 2004 to 2011.  The data was 
collected from two leading Chinese stock market data providers, i.e., WIND Information, 
and CSMAR Solution.  I excluded *ST companies that experienced reverse merger from 
the sample.  Reverse merger, or “Mai Ke (买壳)” in Chinese, refers to the following 
practice.  A private company takes control of an *ST company by buying its stock 
(usually 70% to 90%), and then makes the decision for the *ST company to acquire the 
private firm.  Doing this will allow the *ST company to reorganize and turnover by using 
superior assets of the private firm, and the private firm to get access to public capital in 
the stock market.  It has been acknowledged that reversed mergers will often lead to 
major change in top management teams before and after *ST filing and thus confound the 
findings (Darrough, Huang, & Zhao, 2013).  This exclusion narrowed the sample size 
down to 122 *ST firms.   
Following prior studies (e.g., Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Semadeni et al., 2008), for 
each sample *ST company, I examined the year-end reports for each sample *ST 
company, identifying its major executives, i.e., the CEO, CFO, president, and executive 
vice president as the sample executives.  In total, this method led to a sample of 278 
executives of the 122 *ST companies.   
Measures 
Ship-jumping behavior.  I capture executives’ ship-jumping behavior as the 
proactive departure from a company in the two years prior to its *ST announcement.  
Namely, if the company announced its *ST in Year N, I use Year N-3 as the baseline, 
	  92 
extracting the names of the CEO, CFO, president, and executive vice president in the 
company’s year-end report of Year N-3, and comparing them with the top management 
team composition of Year N-2 and Year N-1 to identify sample executives’ turnover 
events prior the sample company’s *ST announcement. 
Importantly, it is possible that not all executive turnover events I identified are 
due to a voluntary and proactive ship-jumping decision.  Instead, the declining companies 
may dismiss some executives as scapegoats for their underperformance (e.g., Gamson & 
Scotch, 1964; Shen & Cho, 2005).  As such, I need to rule out involuntary turnover to 
ensure the robustness of the result.  To accurately identify executives’ ship-jumping 
behavior, I tracked the reemployment of the sample executives, defining ship jumpers as 
executives who took a new executive position within one year after they left the prior 
*ST companies.  I used the database operated by three government-funded head hunting 
firms that mainly focus on business elites in public firms in China.  According to the 
database, the average period for former executives in Chinese public firms to be 
reemployed as top executives is 2.2 years.  In such a manner, the significantly shorter 
reemployment period of these ship-jumping executives (1 year) indicates that they may 
proactively engage in searching for new jobs before departing and thus suffer less 
devaluation on labor market, a central consequence of ship-jumping behavior (Semadeni 
et al;, 2008).  According to this coding rule, 108 of the 278 executives engaged in ship-
jumping behaviors.  The dependent variable, executives’ ship jumping, was thus coded 1 
in the year of jumping, otherwise coded 0.   
Executives’ social capital and peer social capital.  Following prior studies (e.g., 
Marcel & Cowen, 2014), I measured executives’ social capital endowment for year t as 
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their eigenvector centrality (logged) within the board-interlocking network across all 
directors in year t-1.  In this interlocking network, an executive connects with other 
directors by serving on the same board (excluding the tie in his/her own company).  
Comparing with degree centrality that mainly captures the number of ties that a sample 
executive maintains, eigenvector centrality accounts for the importance of different social 
contacts, weighting the ties with well-connected contacts more (Bonacich, 1987; 
Carpenter et al., 2012).  Similarly, peer social capital was operationalized as the sum of 
the logged eigenvector centrality of all other executives and directors in the company.  
These calculations were implemented using UCINET 6. 
Interfirm network.  The size of a sample firm’s interfirm network in year t was 
operationalized as the number of alliances the firm maintained in year t-1, adjusted based 
on the average number of alliances possessed by all public firms in the firm’s industry. 
Control variables.  the analyses controlled for a series of executive- and firm-
level characteristics that may potentially influence executives’ ship jumping.  For 
executives’ personal characteristics, I controlled for their age, their education (5 for 
doctoral, 4 for master, 3 for college, 2 for high school, 1 for otherwise), their experience 
in this industry, their tenure in the sample firm, their tenure on the current position, and 
the proportion of their sharing holding.  Plus, following prior studies (e.g., Semadeni et 
al., 2008), I created three binary variables for their titles in order to control for the 
different effects of hierarchical level.  The variable CEO was coded 1 if the executive 
was the CEO in the sample *ST firm and 0 otherwise.  The variable Board Chair was 
coded 1 if the executive served as the chairman of the board in the sample *ST firm and 0 
otherwise.  The variable Other insider director was coded 1 if the executive served as 
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insider director (not chair) in the sample *ST firm and 0 otherwise.  For firm-level 
features, I controlled for the sample firms’ age, asset scale, and the size of their board of 
directors.   
Also, industry membership may systematically affect executives’ ship-jumping 
behavior.  To guard against the potential unobserved heterogeneity, I created a series of 
industrial dummies and incorporated them in all analyses, but omitted their coefficients 
from the tables to preserve space.   
Importantly, since I selected 122 *ST firms out of 248 *ST firms by excluding all 
firms that experienced reversed merger, I applied Heckman’s two-stage estimation 
procedure (Heckman, 1976) to control for possible sample selection bias and calculated 
the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable in the models. 
Method of Analysis 
Because the observation window is finite (2 years prior to *ST filing), the data is 
right censored (Allison, 1999).  Using logit models to predict the binary outcomes may 
generate downwardly biased estimates (Tuma and Hannan, 1984).  To avoid this right 
censoring problem, I used event history technique to model the likelihood of executive 
ship jumping.  Event history analysis models the hazard rate, which is the likelihood that 
an executive will jump ship at time t, given that he/she has not engaged in ship-jumping 
behavior before t (Allison, 1999; Richards, 2012).  The estimations derived from the 
following Cox proportional hazards regression model (Cox, 1972): ℎ! 𝑡 = ℎ! 𝑡 ×𝑒𝑥𝑝{ 𝛽! × 𝑋!" 𝑡 } 
where h0(t) refers to the baseline hazard function, and Xik(t) refers to the value of 
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the kth independent variable for actor i at time t.  An important benefit of this model is 
that it makes no assumption about the distribution of the baseline hazard function. 
Meanwhile, the error variances of observations involving the same sample firm in 
multiple years may not be independent because of some unobserved features of the focal 
firm.  For this reason, I clustered observations based on firm ID in model specification to 
avoid potential autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2002).  The robust clustered standard error 
calculation, which is a generalization of the sandwich method of calculating 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Baum, Nichols, and Schaffer, 2010) also helps 
address the potential problem of heteroscedasticity. 
RESULTS 
Table 3 provides means, standard deviations, and correlations.  I calculated the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all models in the analysis.  Results show that the 
average VIF value was below 4.6, indicating that multicollinearity did not bias the 
estimates.   
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the event history analyses.  Model 1 provides the 
baseline model including only control variables.  Model 2 adds the four independent 
variables, i.e., executive social capital, executive social capital squared, peer social 
capital, and interfirm network.  Models 3 add the four interaction items.  In the first 
column of each model, I report odds ratios, which represent the proportional change in 
hazard rate from a one-unit increase in the independent variable (Allison, 1999; Richards, 
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2012).  The second column of each model represents Z-scores calculated with robust 
clustered standard errors.  I report Z-scores to demonstrate the direction of each odds 
ratio, i.e., increasing or decreasing hazard rate.  Below, I use the evidence from Models 2 
and 3 in Table 4 to test the hypotheses.  I note that the effects of inverse Mills ratio are 
insignificant in all of the statistic models, suggesting that the results do not suffer from 
potential sample selection bias. 
Among the main effects, Hypothesis 1 posits that executives’ social capital 
endowments have an inverted U-shaped relationship with their ship-jumping behavior, 
such that executives are less likely to jump ship when their social capital endowments are 
particularly low or particularly high.  This hypothesis is supported by the results in Model 
2.  The odds ratio of executive social capital is 2.67 (z=3.83, p<0.05), and the odds ratio 
of the executive social capital squared is 0.20 (z=-6.90, p<0.001).   
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that peer social capital can reduce the likelihood of 
executives’ ship jumping.  The evidence from Model 2 supports this hypothesis.  The 
odds ratio for peer social capital is 0.90 (z=-2.44, p<0.05), indicating that increasing one 
unit of peer social capital is associated with a reduced hazard of executive ship jumping 
by 10.02 percent.   
Hypothesis 3 predicts that interfirm network can reduce the likelihood of 
executives’ ship jumping.  The evidence from Model 2 supports this hypothesis.  The 
odds ratio for the size of interfirm network is 0.87 (z=-2.40, p<0.05), indicating that 
increasing one unit of peer social capital is associated with a reduced hazard of executive 
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ship jumping by 13.11 percent.   
However, the evidence from Model 3 does not support Hypothesis 4a, which 
predicts that peer social capital can strengthen the effect of executive social capital.  The 
odds ratio is 0.04 (z=-2.53, p<0.01) for the interaction between executive social capital 
and peer social capital, and 1.60 (z=2.35, p<0.05) for the interaction between executive 
social capital squared and peer social capital.  These results together show that peer social 
capital actually weakens the effect of executive social capital rather than strengthening it 
as predicted by Hypothesis 2b (see Figure 4). 
Lastly, Hypothesis 4b, which predicts that interfirm network can strengthen the 
effect of executive social capital, is moderately supported.  The results in Model 3 show 
that the odds ratio is 2.15 (z=1.82, p<0.10) for the interaction between executive social 
capital and peer social capital, and 0.62 (z=-1.88, p<0.10) for the interaction between 
executive social capital squared and peer social capital.  These results suggest that in 
firms with large interfirm network, the likelihood of executives with particularly high or 
low social capital endowments declines faster (see Figure 5). 
With respect to the significant control variables, Model 2 shows that, in declining 
firms, the hazard rate of ship jumping is reduced for executives who are older (odds 
ratio=0.39, p<0.01), serve longer in the firms (odds ratio=0.93, p<0.001), and have 
relatively less experience in the industry (odds ratio=1.06, p<0.001). 
DISCUSSION 
When facing the discredited occasions of their firms (e.g., financial decline, 
bankruptcy, delisting, scandal, lawsuit, etc.), executives and directors may either choose 
to stay with the endangered firms and strive to “clean the house”, or opt for jumping ship 
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and saving their own reputation and social status.  Since the ship-jumping choice of 
upper-echelon administrators largely determines whether their firms can retain their 
human and social capital, which is essential for endangered firms to emerge from their 
crisis (Daily, 1994), it is of particular high importance for firms encountering crisis or 
decline.   
Given the prominence and prevalence of ship-jumping behavior, scholars have 
recently devoted increasing effort to highlighting the antecedents of the ship-jumping 
behavior of upper-echelon administrators, especially directors.  For example, Marcel and 
Cowen (2013) focused on the ship-jumping behavior of directors following fraud 
announcement, pointing out that directors with higher relational and human capital are 
more likely to stay and strive to turn around the crisis (“cleaning house”) rather than 
jumping ship.  Boivie, Graffin and Pollock (2012) showed that the financial and 
reputational risk related to shareholder lawsuits and financial restatements can motivate 
directors to jump ship.  However, so far, little effort has been devoted to highlighting how 
executives in declining firms make the decision of jumping ship.  As discussed, as 
insiders deeply embedded in their firms, executives may base their choice of ship 
jumping on different considerations comparing with directors.  Against this backdrop, I 
strive to highlight the mechanism behind executives’ ship-jumping behavior. 
Through the social embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997, 
1999), executives’ decisions and actions are largely influenced by the social ties and 
networks they participate in.  In such a manner, I focus on the effect of executives’ social 
capital on their ship-jumping behavior.  Interestingly, social capital may have seemingly 
paradoxical implications for executives’ ship jumping.  On the one hand, in declining 
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firms, executives’ social capital provides the firms valuable resources and social supports 
to manage and survive the decline (e.g., Daily, 1995; Fischer & Pollock, 2004, 
Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001).  Therefore, executives’ social capital may drive 
firms to strive to retain them, thus increasing the opportunity costs for them to jump ship.  
On the other hand, however, executives’ social capital can also provide executives more 
external employment opportunities thus facilitating them to jump ship (Burt, 2001; 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).  In such a manner, the way in which 
executives’ social capital affects their ship jumping remains unclear. 
This seemingly paradoxical implication represents an essential yet understudied 
issue in social network research: In which way would executives use their social capital 
and social network (Carpenter et al., 2012)? It has been recently noted that actors 
intentionally determine the way in which they utilize their social capital (Jiang et al, 2014; 
Levin et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012).  Particularly, simultaneously serving as the 
strategic leader of their firms and as individual social actors, executives may naturally use 
their social capital and social network, one of their central personal endowments, in two 
different ways.  On the one hand, they can use their personal social capital endowments 
to serve the best interest of their firms.  On the other hand, they can instead decide to 
utilize their social capital in ways that can best serve their self-interest.  The 
aforementioned debate on executives’ ship jumping in declining firms provides an 
example to this two-fold implication of executives’ social capital.  On the one hand, as 
the strategic leader of their firms, executives have the motivation to serve the best interest 
of their firms by staying with the declining firms and using their social capital to prevent 
the decline.  However, as discussed, doing so may personally stigmatize these executives 
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and cause personal losses such as tainted reputation and devaluation on labor market 
(Semadeni et al., 2008).  On the other hand, executives may serve their best self-interest 
by using their social capital to search for ship-jumping opportunities and abandoning the 
declining firms.  This paradox largely blurs the way in which executives’ social capital 
affect their ship-jumping behaviors in declining firms. 
I draw upon the perspective of resource dependence theory to address this puzzle.  
Resource dependence theory (RDT) focuses on the interdependent relationships between 
actors, positing that actors are embedded in a network of interdependencies where they 
rely upon each other to survive and perform (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
These interdependencies largely characterize the relationship between firms and their 
executives (Daily et al., 2001).  On the one hand, firms depend on the resources and 
capabilities of their executives to support their operation and achieve superior 
performance.  On the other hand, executives and directors depend on their firms to secure 
economic rents and develop their personal identity, reputation and social capital 
(Hambrick et al., 1993; Westphal et al., 2006).  In such a manner, executives’ decisions 
and actions, including their ship-jumping behaviors, are naturally influenced by their 
dependencies on their firms as well as on external environments.  As such, RDT provides 
a natural perspective to examine executives’ ship-jumping behavior (Hillman et al., 2009). 
Following this logic, I posit that the benefits and costs of ship-jumping behaviors 
both arise from executives’ interdependencies inside and outside of their firms.  First, as 
discussed, the central benefit of ship-jumping behavior is for executives to avoid being 
personally stigmatized by their firms (Semadeni et al., 2008).  In such a manner, the 
benefits of ship jumping rest upon how much would executives depend on accepting 
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external positions to prevent potential stigmatization by their current firms.  Meanwhile, 
the potential costs of jumping ship, which mainly arise from the opportunity costs of 
giving up the position in the current firms, are largely determined by executives’ 
dependence on their current firms.   
Through this resource dependence perspective, the seemingly paradoxical 
implications can be effectively reconciled.  That is, the social capital endowments of 
executives determine the degree to which they depend on the external employment 
opportunities to avoid being stigmatized by the decline of their firms.  It has been 
acknowledged that executives’ social capital can serve as a buffering mechanism that 
effectively mitigates the negative personal impact of firm crisis on executives 
(Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, Hambrick, 2008; Zajonc, 1980).  Accordingly, executives with 
high social capital endowments depend less on taking new jobs to avoid stigmatization by 
the current firm.  Meanwhile, executives’ social capital also determines the feasibility of 
their external employment opportunities (Dess & Shaw, 2001).  In such a manner, while 
low network endowment makes it more necessary for an executive to jump ship, it also 
confines his/her available opportunities of doing so.  I thus posit an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between executives’ social capital endowment and their ship-jumping 
behavior. 
Moreover, executives largely depend on their firms, as well as their network 
endowments, to develop their social ties and networks (Westphal et al., 2006; Zajac, 
1988).  These internal dependencies also tend to affect executives’ decision to jump ship.  
On the one hand, they determine the opportunity cost of ship-jumping behaviors, such 
that executives may lose important and otherwise irreplaceable identities and connections 
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if they jump ship from firms with abundant social capital endowments.  On the other 
hand, the social capital endowments of a firm also determine executives’ relative power 
and discretion within the firm (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), such that executives may 
be entrenched in firms with high social capital endowments because of the lack of 
decision discretion.  Following this logic, I adopt two indicators for these internal 
dependencies, i.e., the peer social capital, which refers to the social capital endowments 
of other upper echelon administrators in a firm, and the interfirm network, which refers to 
the firm’s interfirm network endowments in the industrial network.  I posit that both peer 
and interfirm network can reduce the likelihood of executive ship jumping behavior, as 
well as strengthen the effect of executives’ social capital on their ship-jumping behavior.   
The evidence from *ST public firms in China largely confirmed the predictions.  
As predicted, executives are less likely to jump ship when their social capital 
endowments are particularly low or particularly high.  This non-monotonic effect of 
executive social capital has been strengthened in firms with abundant interfirm network 
endowments.  Plus, peer social capital endowments of other upper-echelon administrators 
in a firm and the firm’s interfirm network can both effectively discourage its executives 
from jumping ship when encountering decline or crisis.   
A surprising finding, however, is that in contrast to the prediction, the effect of 
executives’ social capital on their ship-jumping behavior has been weakened in firms 
with high levels of peer social capital endowments.  To Figure 2, the inverted U-shaped 
effect of executives’ social capital endowments becomes flatter when other executives 
and directors are socially well-endowed with abundant social capital and social contacts, 
suggesting that executives with high or low social capital endowments are more likely to 
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jump ship when peer social capital is high.  This surprising result may show that 
executives with low social capital may potentially benefit from their peer administrators’ 
social capital in their search for ship-jumping opportunities.  Likewise, for executives 
with high social capital endowments, when other executives and directors are also 
endowed with high social capital, their firms may devote relatively less effort to retain 
them, therefore potentially reducing their opportunity costs for jumping ship.  Future 
research may benefit from further exploring this intriguing surprise. 
Expected contributions 
I expect this study to contribute to the literature in the following ways.  First, as 
discussed, it has been widely acknowledged in strategic leadership research that top 
executives’ social capital can significantly benefits their firms (Carpenter et al., 2012; Li 
& Zhang, 2007).  As such, scholars have largely equated executives’ social capital as 
valuable endowment of their firms.  However, I pointed out that this argument may be 
incomplete.  That is, executives may use their personal social capital endowments to 
serve the best interest of their firms or to serve their self-interest.  In such a manner, it 
may be incomplete to unconditionally take executives’ social capital as their firms’ 
resources.  Using the instance of executives’ ship-jumping behavior in declining firms, I 
highlight that executives may not always use their social capital to benefit the firm; 
instead, they may use these networks in self-interesting ways to serve their personal 
interest.  As such, I contribute to social capital research by providing a more complete 
understanding about the implications of executive social capital and highlighting the 
boundary conditions of their benefits, i.e., the “managerial social capital” (Acquaah, 2007, 
Peng & Luo, 2000).   
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Second, I contribute to strategic leadership research by exploring a new way of 
applying resource dependence theory in this area.  Resource dependence theory has been 
widely applied in studying the relationship between firms and their upper echelon 
administrators (Hillman et al., 2009).  However, with little exceptions, prior studies 
unilaterally focus on how firms depend on the endowments of their executives and 
directors (e.g., human capital, social capital, reputation, status, etc.) (e.g., Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Daily, 1996; Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003), yet paid little attention to understanding the counterpart of the interdependence, 
i.e., how executives and directors depend on their firms.  By using RDT to highlight how 
firms’ social capital endowments impact executives’ ship-jumping behavior, I explore the 
implications of executives’ dependence on their firms, thus complementing the extant 
strategic leadership and resource dependence studies. 
Lastly, I show that the effects of executives’ social capital for their ship-jumping 
behavior may vary across different levels of social capital endowments of a firm.  This 
finding indicates that executives may intentionally decide the way in which they use their 
networks based on different contingencies.  In this regard, echoing to the call of recent 
comprehensive reviews (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2012), this study points out important 
direction for future managerial decision research, i.e., the decision of their social capital 
utilization.   
Limitations and future extensions 
This study also has limitations on which future research can build.  This study 
highlighted the interplay of resource dependence theory and social network theory when 
explaining the ship-jumping behavior of executives.  However, other theories also 
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provide useful insights.  For example, while RDT emphasizes the power inducement to 
add new alliance partners, other theoretical perspectives, such as prospect theory, also 
provide alternative perspectives to highlight the decision mechanism of executives’ ship 
jumping.  In this regard, future research can benefit from embracing other theoretical 
perspectives and contrasting and integrating them with the current framework. 
Besides, future studies can benefit from exploring the differences and connections 
between the ship-jumping behaviors of executives and directors.  As I discussed, as 
outsiders, directors can simultaneously serve on multiple boards, thus allowing them to 
diversify their risk and giving them more freedom to jump ship.  In contrast, the positions 
of executives are often full-time and exclusive, thus making their turnover more restricted 
and with higher risk and cost.  Plus, I also show that executives’ ship-jumping behavior is 
affected by their peer directors’ social capital endowments, which have been shown as an 
important antecedent of the ship-jumping behavior of directors (e.g., Marcel & Cowen, 
2014).  This may suggest that the ship-jumping behavior of executives and that of 
directors may have potential connections.  In such a manner, future research can benefit 
from theoretically and empirically contrasting the decision mechanisms of executives and 
directors and highlighting their potential connections. 
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FIGURE 4 QUADRATIC INTERACTION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL 
AND PEER SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
FIGURE 5 QUADRATIC BETWEEN EXECUTIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL AND 
INTERFIRM NETWORK 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RATIONALE OF ORIGINAL SIN: A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF NEW VENTURE 
OPPORTUNISM
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INTRODUCTION 
In the interfirm context, opportunism typically represents a firm’s attempts to take 
unfair advantage of its partners by violating mutual agreements or business moral codes 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1979).  Given its prevalence and prominence in 
exchange relationships, opportunism has attracted considerable research efforts during 
the past several decades (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006).  However, despite the fairly 
thorough understanding of opportunism, little has been done to address the following 
question: How firms make the decision to behave opportunistically? Particularly, 
opportunism may incur high potential costs for the opportunistic firms (Das, 2006; Hill, 
1990).  In this regard, what mechanisms drive firms and their decision makers to reach 
the decision of opportunism regardless its high potential costs? 
Exploring the decision mechanisms behind opportunism has important 
implications.  Prior studies have primarily taken the victim’s perspective to study 
opportunism, treating opportunism as a ubiquitous liability in exchange relationships and 
thus providing an advanced understanding of the contingencies stimulating or preventing 
opportunism (Williamson, 1996).  In contrast, little attention has been directed toward 
examining opportunism from the viewpoint of opportunistic actors (Luo, 2007; 
Nooteboom, 1996).  As such, it is hard to fully understand why some firms are more 
opportunistic than others in similar transactional situations.  In this regard, opening the 
black box of decision mechanisms behind opportunism will advance the understanding of 
opportunism by addressing the potential differences between firms’ opportunism 
propensity. 
Against this backdrop, in this study I highlight the decision mechanisms of 
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opportunism in the context of new ventures.  It has been widely realized that compared 
with established firms, new ventures have a relatively high propensity to behave 
opportunistically (Hannafey, 2003; Longenecker, McKinney, & Moore, 1988; Lorenzoni 
& Ornati, 1988)2.  As such, it is relevant and important to highlight the decision-making 
mechanisms behind the prevalent opportunism among new ventures.  It has been widely 
acknowledged that entrepreneurs generally have high discretion in new ventures 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1987), making their decisions essential to ventures’ strategic 
choices, including opportunism.  As such, I specifically focus on the managerial decision-
making process in which entrepreneurs deliberately weigh the benefit and cost of acting 
opportunistically.  Drawing upon the perspective of prospect theory (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and behavioral agency theory (c.f., Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1998), I frame the decision-making mechanism of venture opportunism 
as a loss-averse decision.   
I start by highlighting the major value of opportunism, i.e., securing resources that 
can alleviate short-term threats (Das, 2006; Hill, 1990).  By violating the regulation of 
mutual agreements or informal regulations (social norms, business ethics, etc.) and 
sacrificing partners’ interests, opportunism allows firms to secure extra short-term gains 
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Grossman & Hart, 1986).  It has been noted that entrepreneurs 
are loss-averse actors, who are willing to take significant risk to avoid perceived losses 
(Forlani & Mullins, 2000; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & Castro, 2011; Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  As such, I posit that the merit of opportunism provides 
entrepreneurs a valuable way to avoid potential losses in their entrepreneurial practices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Some prior studies have referred to the high opportunism propensity as “original sin” (e.g., Hebert 
& Link, 1982; Jackall, 1988).	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with certain potential costs.  According to the extant entrepreneurship research, 
entrepreneurs generally face two potential losses: the economic loss related to the 
ventures’ failure, and the noneconomic loss of their personal social identity, reputation, 
social capital, and so on (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  The basic argument is that 
opportunism can benefit entrepreneurs by preventing the economic loss of their new 
ventures, and arise the potential cost of incurring high potential noneconomic loss.   
Specifically, the extra gain from opportunism can help the opportunistic ventures 
to better survive and perform, thus effectively preventing economic losses from venture 
failure (Hannafey, 2003).  In this regard, I predict that when loss-averse entrepreneurs 
perceive high venture failure risk, they are more motivated to engage in opportunism to 
save their ventures and avoid the economic losses of venture failure. 
However, given its illegitimate nature, opportunism is socially discredited and 
thus may potentially contaminate the reputation and legitimacy of opportunistic firms 
(Das, 2006; Heide & John, 1990; Ray, 1994).  As such, due to their close association with 
their ventures, entrepreneurs may be personally stigmatized by their ventures’ 
opportunistic behaviors and personally suffer from noneconomic losses such as tainted 
reputation and damaged social capital (Pozner, 2008; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & 
Hambrick, 2008).  I focus on a specific indicator of the association between entrepreneurs 
and their ventures—the extent to which they use their personal networks to facilitate the 
interorganizational exchange of their new ventures.  Personal networks consist of ties that 
involve friends, relatives, or significant acquaintances.  When entrepreneurs use their 
personal networks to serve their new ventures, they are forced to accept personal 
responsibility for their new ventures’ misdeeds and suffer more from behaving 
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opportunistically.   
Finally, prior studies have shown that personal ties and networks are frequently 
used by entrepreneurs to secure resources needed by their ventures.  As such, the 
perceived level of venture failure risk may also encourage entrepreneurs to draw upon 
their personal networks to support venture survival.  Given that using their personal 
networks decreases the likelihood of acting opportunistically, I predict that the use of 
entrepreneurs’ personal networks will mediate the relationship between venture failure 
risk and opportunistic behavior.   
I strive to contribute to the extant literature in following ways.  First, by modeling 
opportunism as a risky strategic choice, I explore the managerial decision mechanism 
behind new ventures’ opportunism, thus shedding light on the understudied question: 
how do firms reach the risky decision to behave opportunistically? By opening the black 
box of the decision making underlying venture opportunism, this study advances the 
extant opportunism literature with a complementary perspective, which provides more 
complete understanding of opportunism.   
Second, by drawing on behavioral decision theory to model entrepreneurs’ risk-
taking decisions regarding opportunism in their ventures, I contribute to the literature by 
introducing a new perspective to opportunism research—a perspective that complements 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985), the major theoretical backdrop for prior 
opportunism research. 
Third, I theoretically and empirically demonstrate the different implications of 
economic and noneconomic losses for entrepreneurs’ risk-taking decisions in their 
ventures, showing that the economic and noneconomic considerations have sharply 
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different effects on entrepreneurs’ decisions regarding their ventures’ opportunism.  This 
result indicates the tension between the two roles of entrepreneurs, i.e., the strategic 
leader in their ventures and the social actor in their social life, thus pointing out valuable 
directions for future entrepreneurship research. 
Finally, this study also has important implications for business practice.  By 
shedding light on the decision-making process behind opportunism, the findings provide 
valuable insights that can facilitate firms to effectively screen out opportunistic partners 
in their partner selection.   
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF OPPORTUNISTIC ACTION 
As emphasized earlier, opportunism is an intentional business practice with 
specific benefits and costs for the opportunistic actor (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Luo, 
2007; Nooteboom, 1996) so I analyze it as such.  Drawing from prospect theory 
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and behavioral agency theory 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), I propose a model of the behavioral decision 
processes through which entrepreneurs choose whether or not to engage in opportunism 
in their ventures’ operation.  Figure 6 illustrates the theoretical model.   
 
Insert Figure 6 About Here 
 
The Value of Opportunism: A Loss-Averse Perspective 
Despite the well-recognized negative implications of opportunism for victims, 
there is little doubt that it can be instrumentally valuable for opportunistic firms (Luo, 
2006).  By violating formal or informal institutions (contracts, social norms, business 
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ethics, etc.) and sacrificing business partners’ interests and potentially their own 
legitimacy and reputations, actors often secure gains by acting opportunistically (Das, 
2006; Hill, 1990; Jiang, Jin, Jiao, & Ma, 2009).  Particularly, because opportunism 
extracts value from business partners, it typically leads to short-term gains for the 
opportunistic actor (Das, 2006).  These gains can help the opportunistic firms to deal with 
immediate needs and save them from urgent pressure, effectively supporting their 
survival (Hannafey, 2003; Jiang et al., 2009).  Particularly, in the new venture setting, 
opportunistic behavior can enhance a new venture’s resource base and help to mitigate 
short-term resource pressure.  For example, a firm can convey false yet attractive 
information to current and prospective stakeholders, thus increasing its chance to form 
valuable relationships, such as important contracts, alliances and investment ties (John, 
1984; Wathne & Heide, 2000).   
This merit of opportunism is likely to be particularly salient and valuable as the 
short-term gains captured through opportunism can effectively mitigate ventures’ 
survival pressure. 
However, the benefits of opportunism also come with risks and potential costs.  
First, opportunism may fail to achieve the desired gains.  For example, if opportunistic 
behaviors are quickly discovered, those targeted may withhold the promised resources or 
otherwise withdraw their support and may even respond with lawsuits (Brown, Dev, & 
Lee, 2000; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000).  Moreover, as discussed, opportunism is 
largely discredited because of its exploitative and illegitimate nature (Carson et al., 2005; 
Das & Teng, 2001; Ray, 1994).  Therefore, widespread awareness that a venture has 
behaved opportunistically will harm its legitimacy and reputation (Das, 2006; Hill, 1990).  
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These consequences of opportunism may be destructive to new ventures.  Taken together, 
opportunism tends to be a potentially beneficial yet highly risky practice for new ventures.  
Accordingly, an unaddressed question is: When would entrepreneurs decide to take the 
risk and enjoy the beneficial implication of opportunism in their ventures’ operation? 
Through a behavioral decision perspective, I posit that entrepreneurs’ decision of 
opportunism is driven by a loss-averse mechanism.  In their behavioral agency model, 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) suggest that executives are not value-maximizing in 
their decision processes, but rather are loss averse, such that they prefer riskier choices 
when the alternative involves sure losses (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).  Scholars have shown 
that this loss-averse tendency also applies to the decision making of entrepreneurs, who 
are willing to take high risk when facing significant threats or losses (Forlani & Mullins, 
2000; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  In such a manner, it is 
reasonable to predict that given the beneficial outcome of opportunism, entrepreneurs 
may choose to draw on the high risk and engage in opportunism in order to prevent 
perceived losses. 
These potential losses in the new venture context, to the extant entrepreneurship 
literature, (e.g., Batjargal et al., 2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), can be classified into 
two categories: the economic loss related to the ventures’ survival and performance, and 
the noneconomic loss of the socioemotional wellbeing of the entrepreneurs (e.g., social 
identity, reputation, social capital, etc.).  I posit that these two losses play essential and 
distinct roles in entrepreneurs’ loss-averse decision of venture opportunism.   
The Economic Loss: Perceived Venture Failure Risk 
It is not uncommon that many new ventures, as the carrier of the risky 
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entrepreneurship efforts, face economic losses (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Zhang, 
Souitaris, Soh, & Wong, 2008).  Particularly, it has been widely acknowledged that new 
ventures largely suffer from a “liability of newness” (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1983; Stinchcombe, 1965), i.e., the particularly high risk of failure for these 
newly established organizations.  Accordingly, venture failure is one of the most 
important causes of ventures’ economic loss.  In such a manner, when entrepreneurs, as 
loss-averse decision makers, feel threatened by the fear of venture failure, they may 
“grasp at any straw” to avoid the perceived economic loss and save their new ventures 
(Hannafey, 2003).  As discussed above, the potential benefits of acting opportunistically, 
i.e., generating short-term gains and securing extra resources (Das, 2006; Das & Kumar, 
2010), will tend to alleviate the immediate pressure in new ventures’ operation and thus 
support their survival.  In this regard, opportunism provides entrepreneurs an effective 
way to avoid the potential economic loss from venture failure.  Taken together, I posit 
that when venture failure is the reference point in the decision making of entrepreneurs, 
they are more likely to elect to act opportunistically.   
The likelihood that venture failure is the reference point for decision making 
depends on the perceived likelihood of venture failure.  Referent-dependent decision 
research shows that individuals possess multiple reference points, but only the most 
salient (largely subject to its likelihood) dominates decision making at any given time 
(Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; March & 
Shapira, 1992; Tversky & Wakker, 1995).  So, as the risk of venture failure increases, 
failure becomes more and more salient as a reference point in decision making.  This 
suggests that the higher the failure risk in a new venture, the more likely that venture 
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failure will become the reference point of decision making, and accordingly, the more 
likely the outcome will be a choice to act opportunistically (see Figure 6).  Accordingly, I 
now consider the internal and external factors that are associated with venture failure risk. 
Determinants of Venture Failure Risk.  Based on prior entrepreneurship research, 
I suggest that venture failure risk arises both from the intrinsic drawbacks of new 
ventures, including lack of startup resources and low legitimacy (c.f., Palmer, Friedland, 
& Singh, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965), and from environmental volatility (Shepherd, 
Douglas, & Shanley, 2000).   
As newly established organizations, new ventures go through an adaptive process 
through which they establish repetitive organizational processes and accumulate 
knowledge about their task environments (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Schumpeter, 1934).  This process is characterized by intensive 
investment coupled with low returns, and new ventures seldom have enough resources to 
ensure survival (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983).  
In such a manner, resource scarcity is among the central causes of venture failure 
(Aspelund, Berg-Utby, & Skjevdal, 2005).  In such a manner, entrepreneurs tend to be 
threatened by possible venture failure when facing severe lack of resources.  Moreover, 
as discussed, opportunism can help new ventures to gain extra resources.  To the 
resource-constrained ventures, the resources secured through opportunism are of 
particularly high value, effectively alleviating the pressure of resource scarcity.  Taken 
together, I posit that the resource scarcity of new ventures can motivate entrepreneurs to 
engage in opportunism to save their new ventures from possible failure.   
H1a: The severity of a new venture’s resource scarcity is positively related to the 
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extent to which it acts opportunistically. 
Additionally, new ventures generally suffer from low legitimacy because they are 
not fully embedded in the industrial networks (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Palmer et al., 
1986).  A firm’s legitimacy refers to a peer judgment of its appropriateness and 
desirability within the institutional system of norms and values in its industrial context 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Suchman, 1995).  It has been consensually acknowledged 
that legitimacy is critical for a firm to get access to external support and the resources 
held by other firms, which are essential for new ventures to overcome the liability of 
newness (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  However, as newly established firms, new 
ventures commonly have little accomplishment records or existing relationships with 
incumbent firms.  This information asymmetry largely hampers these young 
organizations from demonstrating their appropriateness and desirability and earning the 
accreditation from peer firms in their industrial environments to (Shane & Cable, 2002).  
As a result, the lack of legitimacy impedes new ventures from effectively securing 
external support from other firms, thus jeopardizing their survival (Shepherd et al., 2000; 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  Following the logic above, it is reasonable that legitimacy 
also shapes entrepreneurs’ decision making of opportunism, such that when the 
legitimacy of their new ventures is low, entrepreneurs are more likely to be threatened by 
the possible venture failure and thus engage in opportunism to save their ventures.  I have 
the following hypothesis: 
H1b: A new venture’s lack of legitimacy is positively related to the extent to which it 
acts opportunistically. 
In addition to resource scarcity and legitimacy, venture failure is also linked to 
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environmental volatility – the unpredictability of the contextual factors in a given 
industrial setting over time (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993; Carson et al., 2006; Luo, 
2007).  Volatile environments intensify the liability of newness (Shepherd et al., 2000).  
An environment characterized by continuous and unpredictable changes inhibits firms 
from forming and stabilizing supportive relationships with external stakeholders, thus 
hampering their resource and knowledge accumulation and endangering their survival 
and growth (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Shane & Stuart, 2002).  New 
ventures are particularly vulnerable to environmental volatility.  Because their resource 
base tends to be weak and committed support from external stakeholders is lacking, new 
ventures often struggle to survive and adapt to environment changes.  Further, because 
they lack experience, new ventures are pressed for knowledge that can help them to 
manage a volatile environment (Jiang et al., 2009; Thornhill & Amit, 2003).  As such, 
environmental volatility also increases venture failure risk, and, accordingly, encourages 
entrepreneurs to act opportunistically to save their ventures from failing.   
H1c: Environmental volatility is positively related to the extent to which it acts 
opportunistically. 
The Noneconomic Loss: Stigma-by-Association and Social Network Utilization 
It has been acknowledged that entrepreneurship is not a purely economic practice, 
but rather possesses social characters (Larson & Starr, 1993; Zafirovski, 1999).  As a 
result, entrepreneurs also face certain noneconomic losses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  
Particularly, entrepreneurs are commonly identified as the leaders and key agents of their 
ventures.  As such, the actions and operational practices of new ventures are typically 
attributed directly to entrepreneurs (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987), potentially affecting their 
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socioemotional wellbeing (e.g., their reputation, social identity, social capital, etc.).  For 
example, Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2007) found that the reputation and social status 
of a family is largely bonded with its family venture.  For this reason, the noneconomic 
losses related to ventures’ opportunism are a special set of potential societal costs 
confronting entrepreneurs personally in new venture decision making.  According to 
behavioral agency theory, entrepreneurs are more likely to avoid risk when they 
personally bear the negative consequences of risk taking (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998).  Moreover, the noneconomic losses personally borne by entrepreneurs will 
naturally shift the reference point in decision making away from the economic loss of 
venture failure.  As a result, the noneconomic loss arising from new ventures’ 
opportunism will make entrepreneurs more cautious in making the choice to act 
opportunistically.   
The noneconomic losses related to acting opportunistically naturally arise from 
the negative implications of the behavior.  Because behaving opportunistically violates 
widely held principles of business ethics and social norms, opportunism is generally 
discredited as a business practice (Longenecker et al., 1988).  As a result, opportunism 
endangers the opportunistic firms’ reputation and legitimacy (Das, 2006; Heide & John, 
1990), and contaminates its social identity (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009).  
Prior research has illustrated how contaminated organizational identity, i.e., stigma, may 
transfer from firms to their members, especially managers (D'Aveni, 1990; Kulik, 
Bainbridge, & Cregan, 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  As the 
major agents of their firms, managers are often perceived as personally associated with 
and responsible for their firms’ actions and outcomes (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & 
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Sanders, 2004; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987; Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 2008).  As 
such, when discrediting events stigmatize a firm (corporate failure, organizational 
misconduct, etc.), its managers are likely to be tainted by their association with the 
discrediting organization (Pozner, 2008).  From this perspective, as the clear leaders of 
their ventures (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), entrepreneurs are particularly likely to 
personally bear some costs when they choose to act opportunistically in their ventures, 
therefore causing noneconomic losses such as tainted personal reputation and social 
identity and damaged social capital.   
I focus on a specific indicator of the perceived association between entrepreneurs 
and their ventures’ opportunism—the extent to which entrepreneurs use their personal 
ties and networks in their ventures.  As the major leader of their new ventures, 
entrepreneurs frequently (though not universally) use their personal networks to support 
the operation of their ventures (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Larson & Starr, 1993; Li & 
Zhang, 2007).  Since actors’ personal networks are commonly recognized as valuable 
personal endowments, or, social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 
2001), lending this valuable social capital to new ventures indicates entrepreneurs’ strong 
commitment to their ventures (Jiang et al., 2009).  Accordingly, the utilization of 
entrepreneurs’ personal networks indicates a strong association between the 
entrepreneurs and their new ventures, which, to the perspective of “stigma-by-association” 
(Devers et al., 2009; Goffman, 1963), leads external stakeholders to attribute the 
responsibility of new ventures’ discredited actions, including opportunism, to 
entrepreneurs personally. 
More importantly, by using their personal networks to support their new ventures, 
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entrepreneurs are likely to be forced to take personal responsibility for actions involving 
personal ties (Carpenter, Li, & Jiang, 2012).  Using entrepreneurs’ personal networks in 
ventures reflects the logic of social embeddedness – “commercial transactions take place 
through social relations and networks of relations that use exchange protocols associated 
with social, noncommercial attachment to govern business dealing” (Uzzi, 1999).  In 
transactions conducted on the basis of entrepreneurs’ personal connections, entrepreneurs 
participate in these transactions as individual social entities as well as the agents of their 
ventures, such that stakeholders may extend resources to a given venture largely out of 
their perceived personal relationships or obligations to the entrepreneur (Larson & Starr, 
1993).  Accordingly, entrepreneurs may naturally be viewed as personally responsible for 
any discredited practices or undesired outcomes in the business relationships attached to 
them.  Moreover, the social embeddedness perspective highlights that interpersonal moral 
codes and social exchange norms involved in personal networks are linked to business 
relationships (Uzzi, 1997, 1999).  For this reason, undesired actions or outcomes in these 
business relationships may not just breach organization-level business ethics but also 
violate the interpersonal moral codes and social exchange norms that individual 
entrepreneurs follow in their personal lives.   
In sum, when entrepreneurs intensively use their personal networks to support the 
operation of their ventures, they are more likely to be perceived as being fully and 
personally responsible for the opportunistic behaviors enacted by their ventures.  This 
perceived association makes venture opportunism more likely to stigmatize entrepreneurs 
as individuals and leads to the noneconomic losses (contaminated reputation, damaged 
social capital, etc.) personally borne by the entrepreneurs.  As a result, entrepreneurs are 
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more likely to avoid acting opportunistically in their ventures when they have used their 
personal networks to serve their ventures.  Formally stated, and illustrated in Figure 6: 
H2: The extent to which an entrepreneur uses personal networks in his or her new 
venture will be negatively associated with the extent to which the venture acts 
opportunistically. 
Venture Failure Risk and Entrepreneurs’ Use of Personal Ties and Networks  
Prior studies have widely acknowledged the merits of managers using their 
personal social ties for the benefit of their organizations (Acquaah, 2007; Li, Poppo, & 
Zhou, 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000).  First, through the perspective of social embeddedness 
(c.f., Uzzi, 1997), managers can draw on the norms of mutual support and mutual 
obligation and the interpersonal affection embedded in their personal networks to 
persuade or obligate their social contacts to be more generous and supportive in interfirm 
transactions, therefore facilitating their access to valuable external resources (Gulati, 
1995; Shane & Cable, 2002).  In such a manner, the use of entrepreneur’s personal ties 
and networks can facilitate their new ventures to secure resources from critical resource 
providers, such as investors and alliance partners (Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Hallen, 2008; Shane & Cable, 2002), thus compensating for 
otherwise insufficient startup resources of new ventures (Hsu, 2007).  Accordingly, the 
utilization of entrepreneurs’ personal networks provides an effective solution to ventures’ 
resource scarcity. 
H3a: The severity of a new venture’s resource scarcity will be positively associated 
with the extent to which its entrepreneurs use their personal networks to 
support the venture. 
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Likewise, entrepreneurs’ personal connections also facilitate new ventures to 
establish their legitimacy (Hallen, 2008).  On the one hand, well-connected entrepreneurs 
per se are strong signals for their ventures’ legitimacy (Hallen, 2008; Hsu, 2007), such 
that their personal social capital and status can help convince external stakeholders about 
the appropriateness and desirability of their ventures.  On the other hand, entrepreneurs 
can use their social contacts as channels to effectively conduct private information about 
venture quality and promise at lower cost to external stakeholders (Burt, 1992; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Uzzi, 1997), thus alleviating the information asymmetry between their 
ventures and peer firms (Shane & Cable, 2002).  In such a manner, when a new venture 
suffers from the lack of legitimacy, its entrepreneurs tend to be more encouraged to use 
their personal networks to overcome this liability. 
H3b: A new venture’s lack of legitimacy will be positively associated with the extent 
to which its entrepreneurs use their personal networks to support the venture. 
Finally, using entrepreneurs’ personal networks can also help new ventures to 
manage environmental volatility.  Specifically, the social networks of entrepreneurs can 
facilitate the communication between new ventures and their key external stakeholders, 
thus effectively compensating for the opaque and unverifiable information in volatile 
environments and facilitating the information scanning and sensemaking of the ventures 
(Li & Zhang, 2007; Li, Liu, & Cannella, 2008; Luo, 2003).  Furthermore, in spite of the 
inefficacy of formal institutions under high environmental volatility, the interpersonal 
moral codes attached in entrepreneurs’ personal networks can provide extra informal 
institutional support (Boyd & Fulk, 1996; Luo, 2007; Xin & Pearce, 1998).  As such, 
entrepreneurs are more likely to use their personal networks to support their ventures 
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when facing the threats of volatile environments. 
H3c: The severity of a new venture’s environmental volatility will be positively 
associated with the extent to which its entrepreneurs use their personal 
networks to support the venture.   
Taken together, as strategic choices, opportunism and using entrepreneurs’ 
personal ties and networks can both serve as solutions for entrepreneurs striving to cope 
with the threat of venture failure.  However, a central difference between these two 
choices is that unlike opportunistic behaviors, which are characterized by extra 
orientation and the logic of value appropriation (Claro, Hagelaar, & Omta, 2003; Das, 
2006; Wathne & Heide, 2000), using entrepreneurs’ personal ties and networks to support 
venture survival represents the logic of sustainable and cooperative value creation based 
on reciprocity and mutual obligation (Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004).  Comparing 
the conflicting and naturally mutually exclusive natures of these choices, it is reasonable 
to see that in the long run, using entrepreneurs’ personal ties and networks provides a 
better alternative to opportunism as a strategic choice.  Accordingly, using entrepreneurs’ 
personal ties and networks as a solution to the potential threats of venture failure may 
intrinsically reduce the necessity for new ventures to behave opportunistically.  Also, as 
discussed above, using these personal ties and networks can directly reduce ventures’ 
opportunism by increasing the personal losses associated with acting opportunistically.  
Taken together, I predict a partially mediated relationship for use of entrepreneurs’ 
personal ties and networks and new venture opportunism (as shown in Figure 6).  
Formally stated: 
H4a: The use of entrepreneurs’ personal ties and networks in new ventures will 
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partially mediate the relationship between new ventures’ resource scarcity and 
opportunism. 
H4b:   The use of entrepreneurs’ personal ties and networks in new ventures will 
partially mediate the relationships between new ventures’ lack of legitimacy and 
opportunism. 
H4c:   The use of entrepreneurs’ personal ties and networks in new ventures will 
partially mediate the relationships between environmental volatility and new 
ventures’ opportunism. 
METHOD 
Sample 
I chose the computer and communication equipment manufacturing industry in 
three southeast provinces in China as the research setting.  I chose this setting for several 
reasons.  First, the computer and communication equipment manufacturing industry is 
dominated by new ventures in China (Dowling & McGee, 1994; McDougall, 1989; 
Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006).  Second, according to official industrial reports (China 
yearbook, 2011), the industry in these three provinces is well established, including 
relatively complete industrial value chains, well-developed infrastructures, and strong 
connections and cooperation between firms and research institutes (c.f., Porter, 1985).  
These munificent environments further encourage entrepreneurial actions (Venkataraman, 
1997).  Additionally (and important for the methodology), opportunistic behavior can be 
judged most objectively and accurately by external stakeholders who have relational 
experience with the firms in question (c.f., Carson et al., 2006; Luo, 2007).  Using 
participant firms in the same region and same industry allows us to capture intra-industry 
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networks across sample firms and, accordingly, use these networks to locate qualified 
informant firms to evaluate the extent of new venture opportunism.   
Data collection 
Our data collection process was conducted from February 2010 to October 2011.  
I began by conducting 25 interviews (with 16 top managers in computer and 
communication equipment manufacturing firms and 9 executives in industrial 
associations) to ensure the content validity of the survey items.  Interviewees were asked 
to check the relevance and completeness of the items based on their industrial experience 
and personal perceptions.  Based on their responses and suggestions, I made minor 
adjustments to several items to enhance their content validity in the research setting.  
With the adjusted survey, I then conducted a pilot study with 69 top managers in the three 
sample provinces and finalized the items used in the formal survey. 
The data collection process included multiple stages and involved both 
established firms and new ventures.  First, with the assistance of a government-funded 
national research institution, I secured access to a directory including the total 4,386 
firms registered in the communication equipment manufacturing industry in the three 
provinces.  I contacted all 4,386 firms to request their CEOs or general managers to 
indicate at least 3 firms with which they have or have had business relationships or of 
which they are aware as participants in their industry.  After a follow-up reminder, I 
received 329 responses, with each response nominating at least 3 firms.  As a result, these 
respondents nominated a total of 631 individual firms, where 187 firms (29.6%) were 
nominated more than once.  I used these 631 firms as the survey sample frame.   
Prior entrepreneurship studies in China have commonly defined new ventures as 
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firms younger than 5 years (e.g., Li & Zhang, 2007; Zhao & Aram, 1995).  the 
interviewees from both firms and industrial associations largely consented to this 
criterion for identifying new ventures in computer and communication equipment 
industry in China.  As such I defined new ventures as firms founded within the past 5 
years.  Following this definition, 206 out the 631 sample firms were classified as new 
ventures.  The average age was 12.23 years (SD=5.69) for all participant firms (including 
both new ventures and established firms), and 2.18 years (SD=2.01) for sample new 
ventures.   
After identifying the survey participants, I conducted the next round of surveys.  
To avoid consistency biases that may exist when both independent and dependent 
variables are collected at the same time (c.f., Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), I used a 
temporally lagged design involving two time periods, collecting explanatory variables at 
Time 1 and predictor variables at Time 2 (approximately five months later).  All sample 
firms received the same Time 1 survey, capturing some independent variables such as 
low legitimacy, information unverifiability and institutional inefficacy.  As I will describe 
below, resource scarcity was captured from archival data.  At Time 2, I adopted two 
different versions of the survey, such that new ventures were only asked to report their 
utilization of their leaders’ personal ties and networks, while established firms were 
asked to report their business partners’ opportunism.  This separation of informants is 
designed to reduce self-report bias in the assessment of opportunism.  Preliminary tests of 
the Time 2 survey data showed that new ventures have a higher opportunism propensity 
than established firms (t=2.78, p<0.01), but their use of managerial networks was not 
different from that of established firms (t=1.32, ns.). 
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A total of 606 sample firms (96.0%) made effective responses to both Time 1 and 
Time 2 surveys, including 201 new ventures (97.6%) and 405 established firms (95.3%).  
These sample new ventures and established firms showed no significant difference with 
the non-responding ventures and established firms in their average age, scale of 
registered capital and number of employees.  I used the 201 new ventures as the final 
sample for theoretical testing, and using the information from the 405 established firms to 
assess the opportunism and resource scarcity of the sample ventures (as discussed below) 
and crosscheck the reliability of the answers from sample ventures. 
Variables and Measures 
Table 5 provides a list of the major survey items, along with which survey stage 
they came from (Time 1 or Time 2), reliability statistics and the results of the 
confirmatory factor analysis.  Since some of the original measures were from prior 
studies published in English, I consulted three Chinese experts in entrepreneurship and 
opportunism research who had served as faculty members in US universities to ensure the 
accuracy of the translation. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
 
Opportunism.  the six-item opportunism measure was designed based on 
references to earlier works (Anderson, 1988; John, 1984; Luo, 2007).  Based on pre-
survey interviews, I made some small adjustments in item expression to fit the 
uniqueness of the industry.  As a network level variable, opportunism was measured with 
a whole network design approach (c.f., Marsden, 1990; Scott, 2000), i.e., each participant 
firm was asked to answer the six questions regarding each firm with which it was related 
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or aware of in operation.  For each new venture, I then averaged across the appraisals it 
received from all informants on each item and used the mean as its score on this item.  To 
gauge the reliability for this measure, I measured the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC), which captures whether the variance between different sample groups is 
significantly greater than the variance within groups, and uses a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) approach to gauge the difference (Kenny & La Voie, 1985).  An ICC 
coefficient above 0.50 signifies moderate agreement, while a coefficient above 0.70 
indicates substantial agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984).  Result showed that the 
ICC of opportunism appraisals sample ventures received is 0.68, suggesting relatively 
high within-group agreement. 
Resource scarcity.  I averaged across the registered startup assets that each 
participant firm reported when it established and filed with its local government.  Then, 
for each sample venture, I computed a ratio of its assets to the average startup assets of all 
established firms in the survey.  I used the difference between 1 and this ratio as indicator 
of resource scarcity. 
Lack of legitimacy.  Legitimacy refers to the extent to which a firm can have its 
actions accepted and endorsed by its stakeholders reflecting the degree of the firm’s 
embeddedness in its industrial context (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995).  
Following the suggestion of prior studies (e.g., Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Singh, House, 
& Tucker, 1986), I measured firms’ legitimacy as their embeddedness in the industrial 
network, i.e., the times the firm was nominated as a relational partner by other firms.  I 
identified three forms of interorganizational relationships: historical ties (“with which 
firms your firm has had business relationships (including current ones)”), intended ties 
	  132 
(“with which firms your firm wants to establish future business relationships”), and 
awareness ties (“beyond those your firm either has had or is going to have business 
relationships, which firms are known by you as participants of communication equipment 
manufacturing industry”).  For each form of relationships, I operationalize the lack of 
legitimacy as the difference between 1 and the ratio of a new venture’s nomination 
frequency to the average nomination frequency of all established firms in the survey.  I 
generated a higher order factor of the three ratios to capture sample ventures’ overall 
legitimacy. 
Environmental volatility.  Accordingly to prior research (e.g., Luo, 2007; Milliken, 
1987), environmental volatility is a multidimensional construct, depicting the degree of 
unpredictability, unverifiability, and changeability in both industrial and regional 
environments (Dess & Beard, 1984; Miller, 1987).  In this study I captured environmental 
volatility using two volatility constructs suggested by Luo (2007) and Jiang et al., (2009), 
i.e., information unverifiability and institutional inefficacy (labeled as law 
unenforceability in Luo’s 2007 study).  Information unverifiability refers to the extent to 
which “the true information about micro- and macro-business environments facing an 
individual business is difficult to verify” (Luo, 2007: 43).  Institutional inefficacy refers 
to the degree to which a firm face untrustworthy legal and governmental systems that 
lack effective law enforcement and supervision mechanisms and experience frequent 
unjustified regulation changes (Jiang et al., 2009; Luo, 2007).  It has been noted that in an 
emerging economy (like China), environmental volatility are largely resulted from the 
difficulties to obtain, verify and interpret information due to the industrial and 
institutional transformation, and the weak legal protection and government industrial 
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policies (Brown, 1997; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Hare & Davis, 1997; Luo, 2003).  In such 
a manner, the two volatility variables I chose, i.e., information unverifiability and 
institutional inefficacy, can capture the major sources of environmental volatility 
encountered by Chinese firms.  The participants of the pre-survey interviews also 
confirmed the variable selection.  Both variables were measured by the items adopted by 
Luo (2007), with minor adjustments based on pre-survey interviews and pilot study 
results. 
Use of entrepreneurs’ social ties and networks.  I measured entrepreneurs’ efforts 
to use their personal ties and networks in their business practices by using the items 
developed in prior studies (e.g., Acquaah, 2007; Peng & Luo, 2000), asking sample 
entrepreneurs to appraise the extent to which they use their personal ties with customers, 
suppliers, competitors, and investors, in their new ventures’ operation.  Importantly, 
following the suggestions of the interviewees, I added an extra item—ties to investors—
as a part of the measure.   
I adopted the age of the new venture and entrepreneurs’ industrial experience as 
control variables.  As noted by prior work, as ventures age, their startup liabilities and 
risk of failure decline as time passes (Palmer et al., 1986), reducing the motivation to use 
opportunism.  Further, entrepreneurs’ prior experience importantly affects their available 
managerial ties (Hallen, 2008).  These data were collected from the Time 1 survey. 
RESULTS 
I used structural equation modeling to test the hypotheses.  Following the two-
step approach suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), I estimated a measurement 
model prior to examining structural model relationships. 
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Measurement Model Results  
In the measurement model test, I conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), 
and examined internal consistency and convergent and discriminant validity.  As reported 
in Table 5, all non-fixed indicators loaded appropriately and significantly (p<.01).  In 
practice, factor loadings higher than 0.7 are considered acceptable (Carmines & Zeller, 
1979).  This criterion is met by all the items in the model.  Further, the CFA model also 
shows high goodness of fit: χ2= 197.69, with 175 degrees of freedom; normed fit index 
(NFI) =0.92; non-normed fit index (NNFI) =0.93; comparative fit index (CFI) =0.91; root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) =0.058.  These results suggest high 
reliability of the measurement model.   
I use Cronbach’s Alpha (α) to test the internal consistency of the measures.  As 
reported in Table 5, all latent variables in the measurement model demonstrate adequate 
internal consistency (α higher than 0.70).  In Table 7, I also report each latent variable’s 
average variance extracted (AVE, the average variance explained by all indicators of a 
latent variable) to substantiate convergent validity).  I can see in Table 7 that all variables 
exceed the threshold of 0.50 recommended by Fornell and Larcker (1981), suggesting 
high convergent validity. 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
 
Lastly, discriminant validity is supported when the correlation coefficient between 
two constructs is lower than the square root of AVE of these two constructs (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981), ensuring that each construct shares more variance with its own items than 
it shares with other constructs.  In Table 7, the above criterion is met across all possible 
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parts of latent variables, such that diagonal elements are larger than corresponding off-
diagonal cells.  This evidence indicates that the constructs have high discriminant validity. 
Structural Model Results 
Figure 7 displays the structural model results.  the model generated the following 
goodness of fit indices: χ2=185.06, with 163 degrees of freedom, NFI=0.93, NNFI=0.94, 
CFI=0.92, RMSEA=0.049.  These results together show high model fit.   
Insert Figure 7 About Here 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the determinants of new venture failure risk, i.e., 
resource scarcity, low legitimacy and environmental volatility, will stimulate ventures’ 
opportunism.  The results provide strong support for all three independent variables.  For 
example, both resource scarcity and low legitimacy are positively related to new ventures’ 
opportunism (γ21=.397, p<.001; γ22=.325, p<.001).  Likewise, environmental volatility 
also encourages opportunism (for informational unverifiability, γ23=.300, p<.001; for 
institutional inefficacy, γ24=.285, p<.001).  Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported by the 
evidence in Figure 7. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that entrepreneurs’ use of their personal social ties and 
networks in their ventures can restrict them from acting opportunistically in their ventures’ 
business practices.  This hypothesis also receives strong support from the evidence in 
Figure 7, such that the utilization of entrepreneurs’ personal ties is associated with lower 
new ventures opportunism (β21=-.382, p＜.001).   
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the three antecedents of venture failure risk will 
stimulate entrepreneurs to use their social networks to support their new ventures.  Each 
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of these predictions is strongly supported, such that resource scarcity stimulates 
entrepreneurs to use their personal ties in their ventures (γ11=.297, p<.001), as does low 
legitimacy (γ12=.253, p<.01) and the two indicators of environmental volatility, i.e., 
information unverifiability (γ13=.239, p<.001) and institutional inefficacy (γ14=.211, 
p<.01).   
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that social network utilization would partially 
mediate the relationships between venture failure risk determinants (i.e., resource scarcity, 
low legitimacy, and environmental volatility) and new venture opportunism.  Following 
the recommendations of MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993), I used a Sobel test to examine 
the proposed mediation effects (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982).  Results show that 
all potential paths between opportunism, resource scarcity, low legitimacy, and 
environmental volatility factors are significantly mediated by the utilization of 
entrepreneurs’ personal social ties and networks, strongly supporting Hypothesis 4. 
As mentioned, I controlled for new ventures’ age and entrepreneurs’ industrial 
experience.  Results indicate that entrepreneurs’ use of their personal ties and networks in 
their new ventures is positively associated with venture age (γ15=.080, p<.05), and 
entrepreneurs’ industrial experience has a similar association (γ16=.091, p<.05).  the 
evidence also indicates that venture age is strongly and negatively associated with 
opportunism (γ25=-.082, p<.10).  However, it is important not to infer a direct 
relationship between organizational age and opportunism from the evidence, as this study 
is cross-sectional and cannot be used to draw conclusions about dynamic relationships.  
Finally venture opportunism seems to be lower when entrepreneurs’ have more industrial 
experience (γ26=-.081, p<.10).   
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DISCUSSION 
Opportunism has been widely acknowledged as a destructive liability in economic 
relations given its value-appropriating logic, and self-interested nature (Claro et al., 2003; 
Das, 2006; Wathne & Heide, 2000).  Following this line of reasoning, researchers have 
mainly focused on opportunism governance and avoidance, and have seldom attempted to 
open the black box of opportunism’s antecedents (Luo, 2007).  To begin filling this 
research gap, in this study I emphasized a relatively neglected fact in prior opportunism 
research – that acting opportunistically is a result of a firm’s conscious strategic choice, 
which arises from the firm’s decision-making system.  Drawing on this insight, I 
developed a behavioral model to highlight the detailed decision-making process behind 
new ventures’ opportunism.  Namely, given the extra gains that can be created by 
opportunistic behaviors in business relationships, entrepreneurs may choose opportunism 
as a risky yet beneficial strategic alternative that can be applied to save their new 
ventures from failure.  However, as the major agents of their new ventures, entrepreneurs 
inevitably bear responsibilities and consequences from their new ventures’ operational 
practices, including opportunism (Carpenter et al., 2004; Pozner, 2008).  As such, if 
entrepreneurs may personally bear the potential costs of their new ventures’ opportunism, 
they will be more cautious about using opportunism.  Using data collected from 
communications equipment manufacturing firms in three provinces in China, I 
empirically tested the predictions of this behavioral model.   
Generally, the results provided strong support to the predictions.  First, both new 
ventures’ intrinsic weaknesses (i.e., resource scarcity and low legitimacy) and 
environmental volatility, all of which affect the risk of venture failure, were observed to 
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significantly stimulate entrepreneurs to engage in opportunism.  These results confirm a 
basic prediction of the behavioral model – that entrepreneurs’ propensity to use 
opportunism is tightly connected with the failure risk of their new ventures.  In 
entrepreneurs’ strategic decision making, opportunism is a risky alternative, but perhaps 
preferable to venture failure.  This study is among the first to provide explanations for the 
high opportunistic tendency of new ventures reported in prior work (c.f., Longenecker et 
al., 1988; Pozner, 2008).   
In contrast, I found that the utilization of entrepreneurs’ personal ties and 
networks in venture operation can significantly restrict new ventures’ opportunism.  Prior 
social network and social capital research has long argued that the existence of embedded 
personal ties in business relationships can serve as an effective safeguard against partner 
opportunism (e.g., Goerzen, 2007; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1997, 1999), but have 
seldom tested this prediction empirically or examined the detailed mechanisms 
underlying this proposed relationship.  To this end, the results effectively complement the 
extant literature.   
I developed theory and empirically tested two potential mechanisms through 
which entrepreneurs’ use of personal ties and networks can constrain their opportunistic 
propensities.  On the one hand, as predicted by the behavioral model of opportunism, 
personally bearing significant costs of ventures’ opportunism will deter entrepreneurs 
from using opportunism to save their new ventures.  The use of entrepreneurs’ personal 
ties and networks provides a key indicator of the extent to which entrepreneurs personally 
bear the costs of ventures’ opportunism.  Specifically, when entrepreneurs use their 
personal social networks in their ventures, there will be a strong association between the 
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entrepreneurs as individuals and their ventures as organizations.  Therefore, with 
powerful economic and social sanctions resulting from consequent regulation of 
embeddedness, entrepreneurs are driven to behave appropriately and act in accord with 
other partners’ shared expectations and be more concerned about engaging in 
opportunism.  Otherwise, they are likely to be personally stigmatized by their new 
ventures’ opportunism.   
On the other hand, using personal networks and opportunism both serve as 
operational responses to entrepreneurial drawbacks and environmental volatility.  Given 
their conflicting nature, i.e., opportunism signifies a logic self-interest and value-
appropriation, and personal network utilization signifies a logic of sustainable and 
cooperative value creation, these two choices tend to be substitutes in new ventures’ 
strategic choices.  In such a manner, using value-adding personal networks of 
entrepreneurs provides a better alternative to opportunism for entrepreneurs striving to 
save their new ventures from failure, therefore mediating the opportunism-stimulating 
effect of new ventures’ intrinsic drawbacks and environmental volatility and accordingly, 
reducing new ventures’ necessity and motivation to use opportunism.  Given the 
beneficial implications of opportunism, this constraining effect may suggest a special 
opportunity cost of social capital utilization.  That is, using managerial social capital 
limits the ability to use other operational actions.  As noted by prior network research, 
embeddedness confines participants’ freedom of personal choice (Krackhardt, 1992).  
This study expanded this conclusion, suggesting that as agents of their organizations, 
managers are subject to embeddedness pressure in their strategic decision making, thus 
conducting an embeddedness constraint from interpersonal networks to organizational 
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operations.  These results provide important complements to the understanding of both 
opportunism and social capital in interorganizational contexts.   
This study contributes to knowledge in the following ways.  First and foremost, 
with the specific instance of new ventures, I provide a behavioral framework to account 
for opportunism as a strategic choice.  As discussed earlier, unlike prior studies that have 
mainly treated opportunism from the victims’ perspective, I examine opportunism from 
the standpoint of the perpetrator.  The results confirm a relatively neglected fact about 
opportunism in prior research.  That is, like other business practices such as R&D and 
marketing, opportunism is fundamentally a strategic choice that is determined by 
executive decision making, and is intended to serve the opportunistic firms’ strategic 
demands, subject to constraints of internal endowments and external environments.  As 
such, this study provides an alternative theoretical perspective that largely complements 
transaction cost theory in examining opportunism.   
The results also provide a new perspective to further understanding about the 
implications of social networks and social capital in interorganizational contexts.  
Namely, the opportunism-constraining effects of using managerial social capital actually 
provides an answer to an important yet understudied question in the social capital 
literature: how does using managerial social capital in a focal firm affect other related 
players in the market? As mentioned, the value of social capital to a given firm is well 
known.  However, a firm’s strategic choice and operational actions will not only affect 
itself, but also affect external stakeholders such as competitors, cooperators, regulators, 
investors and so on (Porter, 1980).  Particularly, using social capital implies the 
endorsement of relational partners and thus naturally involves multiple participants.  As 
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such, I can expect that the effects of social capital utilization may go beyond the focal 
firm and affect external stakeholders.  However, by focusing on unilateral benefits of 
social capital to focal firms, existing research has thus far not addressed the potential 
spillover effects of using social capital.  This study provides a specific instance of this 
spillover effect.  Using social capital can constrain a firm’s opportunism, and thus reduce 
transaction costs, signifying a specific form of relational rents that can arise from a firm’s 
access to social capital.   
Limitations and Future Extensions  
As an early research effort examining the antecedents of opportunism, this study 
has several potential limitations that also suggest directions for future research.  First, in 
this study, all theoretical relationships were developed and tested in the specific context 
of new ventures.  It is well-accepted that new ventures generally have a higher likelihood 
of behaving opportunistically.  However, this study did not emphasize established firms 
nor compare them to new ventures.  In this regard, future research can benefit from 
replicating the present study in the context of established firms and comparing the 
conclusions across different contexts.  Particularly, because new ventures always face a 
liability of newness, I identified four specific inducements of opportunistic behavior – 
resource scarcity, low legitimacy, information unverifiability and institutional inefficacy.  
These four factors reflect two basic sets of potential determinants: resource-based and 
environment-based factors.  Under this logic, future research can expand the research 
framework by recognizing more potential inducements.   
Second, the sample was from new ventures in the communication manufacturing 
industry in China.  A natural extension of this study would be to examine the conclusions 
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in different industrial contexts and in different economic systems (especially in Western 
countries with well-established markets and legal systems) to test the generalizability of 
the model. 
Another potential extension to the theoretical framework would be to further 
examine the dynamics of social capital utilization.  In the present study, I developed a 
causal link from the antecedents to consequences of using managerial social capital in the 
focal organization.  However, with the cross-sectional data adopted in this study, I cannot 
further examine the effects of this link on future social capital exploration and 
exploitation.  To expand the present study in a dynamic way, future studies can benefit 
from more longitudinal research designs. 
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TABLE 6  
MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS 
 
 
Numbe
r of 
Items 
AVE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Resource scarcity 1 
 
/ 1.00 
       
Low legitimacy 3 
 
.846 .04 1.00 
      Information 
unverifiability 4 
 
.872 -.01 .05 1.00 
     Institutional 
inefficacy 4 .825 .03 .04 .02 1.00 
    
New venture age 1 / -.03 -.02 .01 .02 1.00 
   Entrepreneur's 
industrial 
experience 1 / .02 .05 .01 .01 .06 1.00 
  Use of personal 
ties & networks 4 .884 .30 .25 .58 .26 .08 .11 1.00 
 
Opportunism 6 .801 .34 .16 .03 .17 -.15 -.09 -.02 1.00 
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FIGURE 6  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
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FIGURE 7  
STRUCTURAL MODEL RESULTS 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
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This dissertation work mainly focuses on shedding light on the following question 
that has remained largely understudied in the extant strategic and organizational research: 
To what extent can top managers’ personal ties and networks actually contribute to their 
firms?  I anatomized this grand question into three logically consequent managerial 
decisions: (1) “When”—when will top managers choose to use their personal ties and 
networks in their firms; (2) “How”—will top managers use their managerial ties and 
networks to serve the best interest of their firms or to satisfy their self-interests; and (3) 
“So what” —how would the decision of using managerial ties and networks to benefit 
their firms influence other decisions of the firms.  I theoretically developed these three 
managerial decisions and empirically tested them. 
Together as a doctoral dissertation, these three studies contribute to prior 
managerial network and managerial social capital research by specifically anatomizing 
the “micro-macro links” between managerial ties and networks as managers’ personal 
endowments and their instrumental value to the focal firms as economic organizations 
(c.f., Li et al., 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000), and therefore help to answer the to date 
understudied question: to what extent can firms actually benefit from the managerial 
ties and networks of their top managers.  As discussed earlier, management and 
organizational scholars so far have almost exclusively treated the favorable implications 
of managerial ties and networks for firms in a taken-for-grant way, barely attempting to 
open the black box of the actual process through which the value of these personal 
endowments of managers can be realized at the organizational level.  By systematically 
anatomizing the potential relationship between the micro and the macro end of such 
“micro-macro link” into three logically consequent questions (i.e., which ties and 
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networks would be in use, to what extent would they be used in value-creating ways for 
the focal firms, and what would be the opportunity costs of their favorable performance 
implications), and drawing on the insight of behavioral decision making theories to fill 
these blanks by closely examining managers’ personal decision making processes, these 
studies provide an exploratory theoretical framework that can be used by future studies to 
determine the practical value of managers’ personal ties and networks to their 
organizations, complementing the extant managerial network and managerial social 
capital research by developing an “inner” perspective to examine the “micro-macro 
links”. 
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